RIGHT TO PROTECT INTERESTS AND INDUSTRY. 159 



sel sailing for the purpose of prosecuting the slave trade on her shores. 

 Nor is there any doubt that so soon as the abolition of slavery becomes 

 universal, international law will sanction dealing with a slaver as with 

 a pirate, and for the same reason of general self-defense. 



Nor is the sea free to any vessel whatever, not carrying the flag of 

 some country, and shown by its papers to be entitled to carry that flag; 

 and the armed vessel of any nation may capture a vessel not so pro- 

 tected. Sailing independently of any particular nationality is harmless 

 in itself, and may be consistent with entire innocence of conduct. But 

 if allowed, it might offer a convenient shelter for many wrongs, and it 

 is therefore prohibited by the law of nations. 



Innocent trade may also be prohibited by any nation between other 

 nations and its colonies, for reasons of j)olicy. Such restrictions have 

 been frequent, and their propriety has never been questioned. That a 

 vessel engaged in such prohibited trade may be captured on the high 

 seas and condemned, is shown by the case of Church v. Hubbart, and 

 other authorities above cited. 



These are instances of the exercise upon the sea of the general right 

 of self-protection, for the common benefit of nations, irrespective of the 

 particular necessity of any one country. In most cases, restrictions 

 imposed upon the freedom of the sea arise out of some particular 

 national necessity. 



Thus it is well settled, that any vessel guilty of an infraction of a 

 revenue or other law within the territorial waters of a nation, may be 

 pursued and captured on the high seas; because, otherwise, such laws, 

 devised for the protection of the national interests, might fail of being 

 adequately enforced. 



Upon this principle also, was based the British act putting restric- 

 tions upon the passage of a vessel on the high sea, approaching Great 

 Britain from a port where infectious disease was raging. Quarantine 

 and health regulations are usually enforced withiu the jurisdictional 

 limit, and so confined, are in ordinary cases sufficient for their purpose. 

 But when in a particular case they are insufficient, and the necessity 

 of protecting the country from incursion of dangerous disease requires 

 it, no right of freedom of the sea stands in the way of putting proper 

 restrictions on the approach of vessels, at any distance from the shore 

 that may be found requisite. (6 Geo. IV, chap. 78.) 



The very grave, and often, to innocent individuals, ruinous restraints 

 upon neutral trade for the interest of belligerents, the validity of which 

 has long been establishedin international law, afford a strong example of 



