RIGHT TO PROTECT INTERESTS AND INDUSTRY. 173 



has no other source than that, except in its conventionalities. Sir E. 

 Phillimore, in Queen v. Kehn {supra, p. GS), remarks in respect to such 

 a case : 



Too rudimental an inquiry must be avoided, but it must be remem- 

 bered that the case is one of primce impressionis, of the greatest im- 

 portance both to England and to other states, and the character of it 

 in some degree necessitates a reference to first principles. In the 

 memorable answer pronounced by Montesquieu to be reponse sans 

 replique, and framed by Lord Mansfield and Sir George Lee, of the 

 British, to the Prussian Government: "The law of nations is said to 

 be founded upon justice, equity, convenience, and the reason of the 

 thing, and confirmed by long usage. 



Chancellor Kent says (1 Commentaries, p. 32) : 



As the end of the law of nations is the happiness and perfection of 

 the general society of mankind, it enjoins upon every nation the puuc- 

 tualobservauce of benevolence and goodwill as well as of justice towards 

 its neighbors. This is equally the policy and the duty of nations. 

 * * * (p. 1S1). The law of nations is placed under the protection of 

 public opinion. * * * Its great fundamental principles are founded 

 in the maxims of eternal truth, in the immutable law of moral obliga- 

 tion, and iu the suggestions of enlightened public interest. 1 



Many authorities on this point have been presented in a former 

 branch of this argument. They might be multiplied to an indefinite 

 extent, as well from continental as from English and American writers 

 and judges. But apology should rather be offered for citing any 

 authority at all, upon a proposition so fundamental and so obvious. 



It is with the greatest respect submitted, and in our judgment it 



1 Says Judge Story (Con. of Laws, see. 3): "In resting on the basis of general 

 convenience and the enlarged sense of national duty, rules have from time to time 

 been promulgated by jurists and supported by courts of justice by a course of judi- 

 cial reasoning which has commanded almost universal confidence, respect, and obedi- 

 ence, without the aid either of municipal statutes or of royal ordinances, or of inter- 

 national treaties." 



Mr. Twiss (Int. Law, part 1, sec. 86), divides the sources of law of nations as follows: 

 "The natural or necessary law of nations, in which the principles of natural justice 

 are applied to the intercourse between states; secondly, customary law of nations 

 which embodies those usages which the continued habit of nations has sanctioned 

 for their mutual iuterest and convenience, and thirdly, the conventional or diplomatic 

 law of nations. * * * Under this last head many regulations will now be found 

 which at first resulted from custom or a general sense of justice." 



Mr. Amos, in his note to Manning (book 2, chap. 1, p. 85) remarks: "Though 

 the customary usages of states in their mutual intercourse must always be held to 

 afford evidence of implied assent, and to continue io be a mean basis of a structure 

 of the law of nations, yet there are several circumstances in modern society which 

 seem to indicate that the region of the influence will become increasingly restricted 

 as compared with that of the influence of well-ascertained ethical principles and 

 formal convention." 



