314 ARGUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 



SEVENTH. 



POINTS IN REPLY TO THE BRITISH COUNTER CASE. 



Since the preparation of the Argument on the part of the United 

 States, on the facts as so far appearing, the British Counter Case has 

 been delivered. It contains a large quantity of matter concerning the 

 nature and habits of the fur-seals, the methods and characteristics of 

 pelagic sealing, and the methods of dealing with the seals at the breed- 

 ing places, which matter, so far as it is relevant at all, is relevant to 

 the question of the alleged property interest and rights of defense of 

 the United States, and to the regulations which may be necessary in 

 order to prevent the extermination of the animal. 



This matter is accompanied with a protest (page 3), that, so far as 

 matter relevant only to the question of regulations is concerned, its 

 introduction before the Arbitrators is at present improper, and that it 

 has been incorporated into the Counter-Case without prejudice to the 

 contention on the part of Great Britain; that the Arbitrators can not 

 consider the question of regulations until they have adjudicated upon 

 the five questions enumerated in Article VI of the treaty. 



The counsel for the United States conceive that there is no ground 

 upon which such an interpretation of the treaty can be supported. 

 That interpretation assumes that there are to be two separate and 

 distinct hearings and two separate and distinct submissions of proofs. 

 There is absolutely nothing in the treaty to warrant such a view, and 

 the distinct provision respecting the Cases and Counter Cases, their 

 contents, the times when they are to be submitted, the preparation of the 

 arguments, the times when they are to be submitted, when the hearing 

 is to begin, and when the matter is finally to be decided, all point to 

 the conclusion that there is to be but one hearing, one submission of 

 evidence, one argument, and one determination. 



It is indeed contemplated by the treaty that in a certain contingency 

 it may not be necessary for the Tribunal to consider the question of 

 concurrent regulations. This, however, simply involves a condition 

 exceedingly common in judicial controversies, that several questions 



