CITATIONS FROM WRITINGS OF JURISTS AND ECONOMISTS. 635 



and framed, to render it of further service. It was highly conducive, 

 then, to the common peace that immediately upon the multiplication 

 of mankind, property should be appointed in movable things, especially 

 such as require the labour and improvement of men, and in those immov- 

 ables which are of immediate and necessary use, as houses for instance; 

 so that the substance of them should belong either separately to par- 

 ticular persons, or to such a number of men as had by peculiar covenant 

 agreed to hold them in the way of positive communion. Further, 

 although there appears some reason in these things why they should 

 rather belong to some than to others, yet the Dominion or Property of 

 them, such as implies the exclusion of all persons beside, was to be 

 confirmed, at least by tacit compact 



VII. That the settling distinct properties turned to the real benefit 

 and advantage of men, when grown more numerous, may be illustrated 

 from the same arguments which Aristotle brings to overthrow the 

 Platonic communion of goods. * * * Upon the introduction of 

 property every one grows more industrious in improving his peculiar 

 portion, and matter and occasion is supplied for the exercise of liber- 

 ality and beneficence towards others. 



Pradier-Fodere, TraitS de Droit international public, vol. IV. Paris, 

 18S8. Pt. Second, Title, I. Oh. in. Paris, 1889, p. 22. 



There is no need of insisting very much to prove that commerce is a 

 necessity of the social state; that it is the result of obligations arising 

 from fellowship. It has been for a long time a commonplace that the 

 end of the human being is to live, not alone, but with his kind, in order 

 to develop his intelligence, to extend his ideas, and to provide for his 

 physical needs in giving his labor in exchange for what he lacks; that 

 men cannot live without the reciprocity of their services more than 

 without the means of satisfying their needs; that rich or poor, powerful 

 or feeble, they are all more or less dependent upon one another; that 

 it is a duty for social man to do everything which can contribute to assist 

 aud to extend fellowship, which is his end and his natural state. Now 

 commerce being the principal means by which men can communicate 

 with each other in fellowship, and transmit things necessary or agree- 

 able to life, the philosophers deduce therefrom that it is the consequence 

 of a natural obligation. But this obligation they do not consider as 

 perfect, — that is to say, as accompanied with the right to constrain; for 

 outside of every formal stipulation one cannot force anyone to sell what 

 he has, or to buy what he has not. 



Twiss, Law of Nations, vol. I, sec. 114, p. 231. New Edition, 1881. 



Sec. 111. The Roman Jurists regarded certain things as incapable 

 by nature of being appropriated. u Et quidem naturali Jure communia 

 sunt omnium lave, aer, aqua profluens, et mare, etper hoc littora maris 1 .'''' 

 It is obvious that the air, running water, and the sea, are not suscep- 

 tible of detention, and consequently cannot be physically reduced into 

 possession, so as to give rise to that permanent relation, which is 

 implied in the juridical notion of property. "Again Nature does not 

 give to man a right of appropriating to himself tilings which may be 

 innocently used, and which are inexhaustible and sufficient for all. 

 For since those things, while common to all, are sufficient to supply the 



1 Just. Inst. L. II. Tit. I. Sec. 1. 



