78 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



There is another consideration: the princijiles which are involved in 

 the controversy affect the most i)ermanent, enduring, and wide-spread 

 interests. Certainly nothing can be more important than a determina- 

 tion of tlie question of the power which one nation may exercise against 

 the citizens and the property of another nation upon the high seas in 

 time of peace. This is a question — some aspects of it well enough set- 

 tled, but other aspects of it quite novel — requiring additional explora- 

 tion, additional elucidation, and additional determination. It is a 

 queslion of tlie gravest and most important character, upon whicli dif- 

 ferences of opinion may arise likely to embroil nations in liostilities 

 and to break u]) the peace of the world. Tlien, again, tliat other ques- 

 tion, the circumstances under wliicli a nation may assert a ri<jht of 

 'property in animals that resort to the seas for a greater or less time 

 during the year, and therefore an animal whicli at different times may 

 place itself under the power of citizens belonging to different nations 

 of the earth — what question of greater imi)ortance can there be than 

 tliat which involves the principles upon which such conflicting claims 

 may be resolved — the fundamental i»rinciples ujton which the institution 

 of property itself stands "I 



Tliese are questions, the permanent importance of which far out- 

 weighs the i)articular interests of the contending ])arties to this contro- 

 versy; and 1 must therefore express the hope that they will be settled 

 as my learned friend says they ought to be settled, by this Tribunal, 

 looking to them as jurists, and feeling the responsibilities of jurists. 

 The judgment awaited from this Tribunal will be, or ought to be, a 

 monument, or rather an oracle, to which present and future times may 

 api)eal as furnishing indisputable evidence of the law of the world. 



Therefore, I think myself justified on this occasion in appealing to 

 each member of this Tribunal — I think it is not unbecoming in me to 

 make that appeal — to discharge and dismiss from his breast every sen- 

 timent of partiality, and even of patriotism, and to look upon this 

 question as if he were a citizen, not of this country, or of that country, 

 but a citizen of the world, having in charge, and having only in charge, 

 the general interests of mankind. The promptings of i)atriotism, every- 

 where else to be heeded, should be silenced here, and nothing should 

 be obeyed except the voice, the supreme voice, of justice and the law. 



But while it is to be a rule of right that is to govern the determina- 

 tion of this Tribunal, what /*.■ that rule of right, and where is it to be 

 found'? In saying that it is to be a rule of right, it is assumed — it is 

 indeed declared — that it must be a moral rule; that is to say, it must 

 be a rule adopted by the moral sense; for there are no rules of right 

 except moral rules. Right and wrong have to do with morality and 

 with morality alone. The law, whether it be international law, or 

 municii)al law, is but a part of the general domain of ethics. It nuxy 

 not include the whole of that domain, but the centres of each system 

 coincide, although the circumference of one may extend beyond the 

 boundaries of the other. 



When I say that the rule must be a moral rule, that is to say, a rule 

 dictated by the moral sense, I do not mean, of course, that it is the 

 moral sense of any individual man, or of any individual nation, because 

 there are dilfeiences in the moral convictions of different men and of 

 different nations. It is a controversy between nations. We cannot 

 apply to it the moral standard, either of one, or of the other, or of any 

 particular nation. Where, then, can we lind it? I submit to you that 

 we must lind the rule in that (jeueral moraJ standard ui)on which all 

 civilized uatiouSj and the ueople of all civilized nations, are agreed. 



