82 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



opinion of mankind, wliicli holds to a strict account every nation that 

 undertakes to depart from, or viohite, its dictates; and it is enforced, 

 in tlie ne-xt ])hice, by the disastrous consequences which nature herself 

 has ordained and made certain to follow from any disobedience of her 

 precepts. This has been v/ell exi)ressed by a distinguished English 

 writer upon international law. 1 refer to Sir Kobert Phillimore. He 

 says: 



It is sometimes said that there can be no law between nations, because they acknowl- 

 edge no common snperioi' autliority, no international executive capable of enforcing 

 the precepts of inti;rnational law. This objection admits of various answers : First, 

 it is a matter of fact that states .and nations rec<)<riiize the existence and independence 

 of eacli other, and out of a recognized society of nations, as out of a society of indi- 

 viduals, law must necessarily spring. The common rules of rigbt approved by 

 nations as regulating tlieir intercourse are of themselves, as has been shown, such a 

 law. Secondlj', the contrary position coni'ounds two distinct things, namely, the 

 physical sanction which law derives from being enforced by su2)erior power, an<l the 

 mora] sanction conferred on it by the fundamental principle of right; tlie error is 

 similar in kind to that Avhich has led jurists to divide moral obligations into perfect 

 .and imperfect. All moral obligations are e(inally perl'ect, though the means of com- 

 pelling their performance is, humanly speaking, more or less ])erl'('ct, as they more 

 or less fall under the cognizance of human law. In like manner, international jus- 

 tice would not be less deserving of that apiiellation if the sanctions of it were wholly 

 incapable of being enforced. 



But irrespectively of any such means of enforcement the law must remain. God 

 has willed the society of States as He has willed the society of individuals. The 

 dictates of the conscience of Ijoth may be violated on earth, but to the national as to 

 the individual conscience, the language of a profound i>hilosoi3her is applicable: 

 " Had it strength as it had right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would 

 absolutely govern the world". 



Lastly, it may lie observed on this head, that the history of the world, and espe- 

 cially of modern times, has been but incuriously and un]irotitably read by him who 

 has not perceived the certain Nemesis which overtakes the transgressors of interna- 

 tional justice; lor, to take but one instance, what an " Iliad of woes" did the prece- 

 dent of the lirst partition of Poland open to the kingdoms who particijiated in that 

 grievous infraction of international law ! The Roman law nobly expi'esses a great 

 moral truth in the maxim, " Jurisjurandi contempta religio satis Denm habet ulto- 

 rem". The commentary of a wise and learned French jurist upon these words is 

 remarkable and may not inaptly close this lirst part of the work : "Paroles (he says) 

 qn'on pent ap])liquer cgalemeut a toute infraction des lois natnrelles. La justice de 

 I'Anteur de ces lois n'est pas moins arm^e centre ceux qui les transgressent quecontre 

 les violateurs du seinient, qui n'ajoute rien a I'obligation de les observer, ni a la 

 force de nos engagements, et qui ne sert qu'a nous raitjieler le souvenir de cette jus- 

 tice inexorable." (Phillimore's International Law, Third Edition, Loudon, 1879, vol. 



I, section LX.) 



And let me cite another extract which I had noted from Sir James 

 Macintosh, and from the same disquisition to which I have already 

 referred : 



The duties of men, of subjects, of princes, of lawgivers, of m.agistrates, and ot 

 states, are all parts of one consistent system of universal morality. Between the 

 most abstract and elementary maxims of moral philosophy, and the most compli- 

 cated controversies of civil and public law there subsists a connection. The princi- 

 ple of justice deeply rooted in the nature and interests of man pervades the whole 

 system and is discoverable in CA'ery part of it, even to the minutest rauiitication in a 

 legal formality or in the construction of an article in a treaty. — (Sir James Mac- 

 intosh, Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations, suh fine.) 



And Mr. Justice Story says in his book on the Conflict of Laws, Oh. 



II, Sec. 35: 



The true foundation on which the administration of international law must rest 

 is that the rules which are to govern are those which arise from mutual interest and 

 utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a contrary doc- 

 trine,' and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice in order that justice may b6 

 done to us in return. 



