ORAL ARGUMENT OP JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 87 



When we look to the more particular sources from which we are to 

 derive knowledge of that law, I tliink tliey are these: First, the actual 

 practice aud usages of nations; and these are to be learned from his- 

 tory, in the modes in whicli the relations and intercourse of nations 

 with one another are conducted, in the acts commonly done by them 

 without objection from other nations, in the treaties which they make 

 with each other — although these should be considered with some 

 degree of caution, for they are sometimes exacted by a more powerful 

 from a weaker nation, and do not always contain the elements of jus- 

 tice. And this practice and these usages are also to be found in the 

 diplomatic correspondence between nations, which assert principles 

 on one side that meet .with acquiescence on the other. 



Another source fiom which we may ascertain the actual practice and 

 usages of nations is from the judgments of tliose courts which pro- 

 fess to administer the laws of nations, — such as prize tribunals, which 

 are sometimes called international tribunals, although, strictly speak- 

 ing, they are not such. When these sources fail to discover the rule by 

 which we are to be bound, we must look to the great source from which 

 all law flows; that is to say, natural law, the dictates of right reason, or 

 what is best termed, perhaps, the law of nature. 



Let me call attention to one most useful source to which we nmylook 

 for ascertaining what the law of nature is, and which is not so com- 

 monly pointed out, I think, by writers. I mean the municipal law. If 

 we want to know what the hiw of nature is upon any given subject, the 

 municipal law is a jirime source of information; and it is so because 

 municipal law is founded upon the law of nature, aud has been culti- 

 vated in every civilized state, as I have endeavored to point out, most 

 assiduously for a thousand years by learned experts, either juriscon- 

 sults, or judges. The eftbrts of sucli men extending over such a long- 

 period of time, in inquiring and determining what justice is in multi- 

 tudes of cases, are a mode of cultivating the system of the law of nature. 

 We know what rules are prescribed by the law of nature from the 

 results of their inquiries; and, therefore, when any question of right 

 arises between nations similar to those questions of right which arise 

 in municipal jurisprudence, the municipal jurisprudence of the several 

 states of the world, so far at least as it is concurring, seems to me to 

 be a prime source of knowledge. 



And, finally, in all cases where we are to seek a knowledge of the 

 dictates of the law of nature, the authority of the jurists, from Grotius, 

 the great master of the science, down through succeeding writers, to 

 those of the present day — a very numerous body of very illustrious men, 

 given to ethical studies and to a consideration of the great relations of 

 independent states with each other— constitutes a source of informa- 

 tion always respected by judicial tribunals. 



That, Mr. President, closes what I have to say in reference to the 

 law which is to govern the determination of the Tribunal; and I am 

 happy to believe that upon this branch of the controversy, at least, I 

 am to anticipate no substantial disagreement from my learned friends 

 upon the other side. I think the subject hardly admits of a difterence 

 of opinion; and from what has already fallen from some of them, I 

 anticipate a concurrence. 

 . Sir Charles Russell. My learned friend must not assume that. 



Mr. Carter. Then let that be considered as unsaid. I am apprised 

 that there may be differences, and I shall listen with some degree of 

 interest to a statement of what those differences are, and to the grounds 

 upon which they may be based. 



