100 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES 0. GARTER, ESQ. 



Mr. Carter. Yes, tliey suggested that they liad the right to assert 

 it. But they protest tliat they liave not asserted it in fact. 



Having described this Ukase of ISlil, and the nature of it such as it 

 appears to be from a fair inter])retation of the face of it, and from the 

 dechirations made by the Kussian Government in reference to it, it is 

 next in order to call tlie attention of the Arbitrators to the notice which 

 was taken of it by the American and the British Governments. But 

 before I enter npou this I desire to occu])y a few moments in dealing- 

 more particularly with the question of the real rights of llussia in or 

 over Bering Sea and its shores, what they were, and the place which 

 they till in argument here, and in the questions submitted to the 

 Tribunal. 



We see what the claim of Russia was by this Ukase of 1821 ; that it 

 was an assertion, not of the right of sovereignty, but of the right to 

 establisli a i)rotective regulation, operative indeed at a greater distance 

 than three miles from the shore. I have, in the course of pointing that 

 out, somewhat briefly alluded to the distinction between the exercise 

 of full and sovereign dominion of a nation over the sea, or over land, 

 as far as that goes, and the exercise of a self protecting power, such as 

 a defensive regulation of this sort is. I wish to follow up those obser- 

 vations a little further, for the purpose of fixing in the m'nds of the 

 Arbitrators the real nature of these two things and of their essential 

 differences. 



What is full dominion or sovereignty such as is exercised by a nation ? 

 What is it? A full right of sovereignty includes, of course, a full 

 right of property over all tlie territory to which tliat sovereignty 

 extends. When I say a full right of pro])erty, 1 mean of absolute 

 l»r<)])erty in the territory over which it extends. That is included in 

 the idea of sovereignty; and it includes in the next place — 



The President. You do not mean pioperty in the civil sense? 



Mr. Carter. I do mean property in the civil sense; but I ought 

 peilmps to explain that. Take the private property in the land of any 

 particular country. Writers on the law of property se})arate property 

 interests into two parts. One of them they call the dominium utiles 

 and the other the dominium cm'mcns. The dominium utile is the right 

 to use and enjoy; and it is that, and that only, which is vested in pri- 

 vate individuals. The dominium eminens means the absolute property, 

 by an exercise of which a nation can at any time displace the individual 

 riglit. That dominium eminens is vested in the sovereign ))ower alone, 

 in the Government; and it is that sovereign right of property which I 

 mean when I say that sovereignty embraces the full property right in 

 the territory over which it extends. 



In tlie next place, it embraces the right of legislation over the whole 

 territory, the right of legislation in resjjcct to persons and things, and 

 consequently the power of excluding any foreign nation or its citizens 

 from any ])ait of the domain which it covers. It embraces the full right 

 of Government; and that is necessarily exclusive of every other Gov- 

 ernment. No other Government can make a single regulation which 

 lias any binding force upon the territory of a foreign power. 



This right of sovereignty, embracing both pro])erty and the right of 

 legislation, is necessarily limited by a rigid b(tundary line. That is one 

 characteristic of sovereignty; it must be limited by a rigid boundary 

 line. Property cannot exist unless it is specified and described; ancl, 

 of course, the limits of the laws of a Government must be absolutely 

 and precisely known : they cannot shift and vary according to circum- 

 stances. It is, therefore, the characteristic of this full sovereignty 



