102 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



But these principles do not rest upon any theoretic statement. They 

 have been universally admitted in the practice of nations; and it is 

 absolutely true — there is no sort of qualillcation to the proposition — 

 that wherever a nation finds it necessary to employ acts of force upon 

 the high seas in order to protect its own rights or the rights of its cit- 

 izens, it has the right to employ such acts of force. There are many 

 Illustrations of this. Many of them arise — becauvSe that is where the 

 occasion most frequently arists — under belligerent conditions. Supi^ose 

 there is a war between the United States and Gieat Britain, and a port 

 of the United States is blockaded, and a British vessel tinds a vessel 

 belonging to France attempting to enter that blockaded port. What 

 does she do? She captures her and carries her in for condemnation. 

 Why? Here is a French vessel, friendly to both powers, not designing 

 to injure either one of them, engaged in peaceful connnerce, not directly 

 aiding or assisting the belligerents ; and yet when she attempts to enter 

 the port of one of them with whom she is a friend, the other who is 

 also a friend, takes her and captures her. How is that to be defended? 

 It is defended on the ground of necessity. Great Britain says: "I 

 am carrying on a war with the United States; 1 am endeavoring to 

 subdue the United States, and to com])el her to come to pea(;e with me. 

 I have a right to reduce her to extremity; and here you are carrying in 

 provisions, or what not, and thus helping to prolong the war and pre- 

 vent me from subduing my enemy, — which I have right to do — and, 

 therefore, I take you and capture you on the high seas." The case 

 of contraband goods is the same. A vessel is found on the high seas, 

 not attempting to enter any blockaded port, but bound to one of the 

 belligerent ])orts and having on board contraband of war. What is done ? 

 She is taken and captured because it is necessary. vShe is attempting 

 to assist an enemy. That Is, she is doing acts which would amount to 

 an assistance and which render the o])erations of one of the belligerent 

 parties less effective. 



It is admitted in international law that when two nations are at war 

 their rights in certain particulars are supreme over other nations, and 

 they have a right to do these acts upon the high seas because they are 

 necessary for self-defence and self-protection. I speak here of belliger- 

 ent conditions; let me pass to other conditions — peaceful conditions — 

 some of those to which I have already alluded, a defence of colonial 

 trade. 



The territory of a nation does not extend more than three miles 

 beyond its coast. We know that. A nation cannot extend its system 

 of law beyond that three miles. We know that; but nevertheless it 

 has a right, as a person, to exert any power of self-defence against 

 threatened invasion of its interests by other persons, and it has a right 

 to do all acts which are necessary for that purpose. The line up to 

 which it may exercise its authority is not a boundary line upon the 

 earth's surface, but it is a line limited by necessity, and by necessity 

 alone. The right is created by necessity, and of course has no other 

 limit than the necessity which creates it. 



The same is the case with all those municipal laws of various nations 

 designed to prevent smuggling. They are enforced the world over, 

 have been enforced for centuries, and are to-day. They purport to be 

 municipal regulations, municipal laws. They are municipal laws in 

 every sense of the word. The hovering statutes of Great Britain, for- 

 bidding a vessel to hover within four leagues of her coast, are binding 

 upon her own citizens because they are laws. Are they binding upon 

 other nations because they are laws? No, they are binding upon other 



