ELEVENTH DAY, APRIL ig^", 1893. 



The Tribunal convened jjursuant to adjournment. 



The PRESIDENT. If you please, Mr. Carter, you may continue your 

 argument. 



Mr. Carter. Mr. President, the point upon which I am now engaged 

 relates to that branch of our argument which deals with the question 

 of the alleged property interest of the United States in the fur seals of 

 Alaska. I had briefly spoken yesterday to the effect that the rival con- 

 tentions of the two Governments upou this subject are to be determined 

 by international law and pointed out our means of ascertaining what 

 the international law upon any ])articular subject was, among which I 

 mentioned an inquiry into what has been decided by municipal law 

 and by the muiiici])al law of various nations so far as that law should 

 be lound to be consentaneous upon the point, in dispute. 



The rival contentions of the two parties upon the (piestion of property 

 I should perhaps brieliy repeat. That of Great Britian is that the fur- 

 seals of Alaska are re*' vommmies. not the subjects of property, but open 

 to the appropriation of all mankind; and that because they are unld 

 animals. The ])<)sition taken on the part of Great Britian is in sub- 

 stance that no H-ild animals are the subjects of pro])erty, and that seals, 

 being wild, are not the subjects of property. The United iStates on the 

 other hand, insist that whether an animal is the subject of property or 

 not depends upon its natureikwd habits; that the two terms " wild" and 

 "tame" are descriptive of nature and habits to a certain extent; but, 

 in order to determine whether any particular animal, whether wild or 

 tame, is the subject of property, we must go into a closer inquiry into 

 its nature and habits; and if it be found that an animal, although com- 

 monly designated as wild, has such nature and such habits as enable 

 man to deal with it substantially as he deals with domestic animals, to 

 establish a species of husbandry in respect to it, then, in respect to the 

 question of property, the same determination nnist be made as in the 

 case of doTnestic animals, and the animal must be declared to be the 

 subject of property. The point, therefore, upon which we first insist is 

 that in considering whether an animal, whether he is designated as 

 "wild" or " tame" is the subject of property or not we must institute a 

 careful inquiry into its luiture and habits and the results of that inquiry 

 will determine the (piestion. In this particular I think I am supported 

 by the best authorities. Chancellor Kent, whose authority I am glad 

 to say is recognized by my learned friends on the other side, for they 

 refer to this very passage whi'di I am about to read to the Tribunal, 

 says (Page 43 of our printed Argument): 



Animals /era; natura:, so lon.i^ as they are reclaimed by the art and power of man, 

 are also the subject of a qualified j)roperty ; but when they are abandoned, or escape, 

 and return to tlieir natural lilxn'ty and ferocity, without the aniiitiiti rererfendi, the 

 property in tlicni ceases. Wh'lc this qualilied pioj)orty continues, it is as nuich under 

 the protection of law as any other property, ami e\'ery invasion of it is redressed in 

 the same manner. The difficulty of ascertaining with precision the application of 

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