ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 153 



and I may be justified tlierefore in stntinf>: it in a different form: That 

 wherever man is capable of e.st:iblishiiif>a husbandry in respect to an 

 animal commonly designated as ''wild'', such a husbandry as is estab- 

 lished in reference to domestic animals, so that he can takethe increase 

 of the animal and devote it to tiie public benefit by furnishing it to the 

 markets of the world, in such cases the animal, although commonly des- 

 ignated as wild, is the subject of property and remains the property of 

 that person as long as the animal is in the habit of voluntarily subject- 

 ing itself to the custody and control of that person. 



Those are doctrines of themunicipr.l law everywhere agreed to. There 

 is no dissent that I am aware of in reference to them; and beingthe uni- 

 versal doctrines of municii)al law they may be taken, I apprehend, in 

 the absence of evidence to the contrary, as being the doctrine of inter- 

 national law. 



Sir Charles Russell. You must not assume that I agree to that. 

 You ^ay it is universally admitted. 



Mr. Carter. 1 do not assume that you agree to anything. 



Sir Charles Russell. I should not have interposed but my learned 

 friend said it was universally admitted. 



Mr. Carter. 1 must understand a permanent exception then to that; 

 but I cannot be very well deprived of the use of the word "geneial" or 

 "universal", because it may be held not to include my learned friend. 

 Let it be understood that 1 do not mean to include him. So far as my 

 knowledge extends these doctrines are universally acceded to. 



The President. Mr. Carter, what would be your legal defiiiition of 

 the word "husbandry" as you just used it. Would it be merely the 

 fact of gathering the increase of an animal? 



Mr. Carter. Yes. 



The President. That is enough to constitute husbandry in your 

 view? 



Mr. Carter. Taking an animal, caring for it, preserving the stock, 

 and taking the increase for the markets of the community — that is 

 husbandry I suppose; the same sort of husbandry that is exercised in 

 respect to sheep, horses, cattle, or any other of our domestic aninmls. 



The President. I better understand your meaning by your defini- 

 tion, than by your simile or your (Comparison. 



Mr. Carter. Well, it seems to me that the definition is good; and 

 it seems to me that the analogies of the animals to which I allude are 

 appropriate. 



There are certain observations which I shall venture to make respect- 

 ing the law so far as I conceive myself to have established it, so far 

 as I have stated it. I mean, in the first place, that it is uniform 

 in all countries and that it may therefore be taken to be international. 

 Second, that it is not founded upon legislation, but upon the 

 principles of the law of nature; declared by the decisions of judicial 

 tribunals as founded upon the law of nature; that that doctrine is made 

 to Turn upon the existence of an animus revertendi ; but 1 may say that 

 this aninrns revertendi must be of itself wholly unimportant. J t is indeed 

 a mere fiction anyway. What do we know about the animus of one of 

 these wild animals? All we know of the intention of the wild animal 

 is that exhibited by its habits; and indeed the law says that the inten- 

 tion is to be inferred only from its Jiabits. As lovjg as the habit of return- 

 ing exists, the intention exists, and when the habit of returning ceases 

 then the intention to return is held to cease. Of what consequence, in 

 itself considered, is this habit of returning, unless it has some social 



