154 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



uses aud purposes'? Why should it be said that a wild animal is the 

 subject of pi<)})erty if he has the habit of returning to the same place, 

 and is not the subjectof property if he hasnotthat habit, and ceases to be 

 the subject of property when once he has lost that habit? Why shonld 

 we say that? Tliere must be some reason for that. Can it be anything 

 else than this that the existence of the habit enables man to treat the 

 animal in the same way as he treats domestic animals and to make 

 the animal subserve the same useful public and social purposes which 

 domestic animals subserve? Plainly that must be the reason for it. 



Take the case of wild swans and geese. They are generally held 

 not to be the subject of property. The law, however takes notice of the 

 exception where those animals have been so far reclaimed that they will 

 continually and habitually resort to a particular place- There the law 

 says they are property; and so long as they have that intention nobody 

 save the owner can lay hands on them, wherever they are, whetlier in 

 that particular x>lace or not. Why does the law say that? Because 

 tliere is a public utility which may be subserved by that. If you allow 

 the possessor of the place to which they resort to have the right of 

 property in them he will devote himself to the business of reclainiing 

 those animals; and consequently society will be supplied with those 

 animals, whereas otherwise it will not. Property is the price which 

 society must pay for the benefit which is thus gained from those ani- 

 mals. Tliey are the ])roduct of the art, and the industry, and the 

 labor which is expended upon them ; and being that product, the bene- 

 fit of it is })roperly awarded to the person who exhibits that art and 

 industry. 



The President. Do you mean to say that the seals reverted to the 

 Pribilof Islands on account of the industry carried ou there? 



Mr, Carter. Yes. 



The President. Perhaps you will come to that later in your argu- 

 ment. 



Mr. Carter. I hope my argument will not be anticipated. I shall 

 not fail to com])1ete the analogy. I am now looking to these other 

 instances. Take deer. Why is it that as long as deer are kept for the 

 purposes of sport the law will not regard them as property? Because 

 as long as they are kept for such purposes they subserve no useful 

 social puri)Ose; but the moment a man undertakes to reclaim deer, to 

 take care of them, to feed them, to treat them as he does domestic ani- 

 mals and to supply the markets of society with venison from them, he 

 is awarded the rights of property in them. That is because he is doing a 

 useful public service ; because it is a public service that would not be per- 

 formed uidess it was paid for, and because it can be paid for only by the 

 award of the right of property to the one who thus expends his labor. 



Take the case of bees. Nothing can be more wild in its nature than a 

 bee. That nature is not in the slightest degree changed when a hive is 

 put inside of a box on the premises of a private individual; and that is 

 all ifc is necessary to do. But what is the consequence of that? It is 

 that a supi)l\- of honey may be taken from that animal, and a much 

 greater supply than if you were driven to hunt through the woods to 

 find hives. The conse(|ue,nce is that when tliat hive swarms, the swarm 

 can be taken and put in another box and thus the number of swarms 

 be multipliedindelinitely and the {>roduct()f honey indefinitely increased. 

 That is a great service to society. It furnishes it with an article of great 

 utility which otherwise it would not have, or would not have in any- 

 thing like the same degree of al)undance; and therefore the art and 

 industry, simple though it be, which is expended upon those particular 



