THIRTEENTH DAY, APRIL 2^«^ 1893. 



The Tribunal met pinsiiant to adjourDmeut. 



The President. Mr, Carter, will you proceed? 



Mr. Carter. Mr. President, the principal part of my argument 

 yesterday was devoted to a review of the questions of fact connected 

 with the nature and habits of the fur-seal, and the modes by which 

 they were pursued and cai)tured; and that review of facts led to these 

 conclusions as matters of fact: In the first i)lacethat the United States 

 in consequence of their proprietorsliip of the Pribilof Islands had a 

 control over the seals which enabled them to take the superiluous 

 increase and supi)ly it to the uses of the world; that that opportunity 

 it had always improved and still im])roves; that no other nation, or the 

 citizens of any other nation, have the power, or the ability, to do that 

 thing; that the race of fur-seals could not maintain itself against 

 unregulated and unrestricted attack; that it could be destroyed at a 

 blow almost on the land, and it could also be destroyed, although not 

 so rapidly, on the sea; that all pelagic pursuit of the animal was neces- 

 sarily destructive in its tendency, and if carried to any considerable 

 extent would work an entire commercial extermination of the race in a 

 comparatively short period of time; that it struck at once at the stock, 

 and not at the increase; that its depredations were princi])ally aimed 

 at the females, and not at the sui^erlluous males, and that no discrimi- 

 nation could be made. 



I am now to call attention to the inquiry how the question of proj)- 

 ertyis affected by those facts in theligiit of the princii)les which I have 

 endeavored to lay down respecting the institution of proi^erty and the 

 grounds and reasons upon which it rests. I wish to ap[>ly those })rin- 

 ciples to the question of property in the fur-seals, and bring those 

 princii»les to bear upon the conclusions of fact to which I yesterday 

 arrived. 



Let me recall the main proposition early established in the course of 

 my argument, and which I have endeavored to keep in view througli- 

 out, namely tins: That the institution of property extends to all things 

 which embrace these three conditions— first, that they are objects of 

 human desire, that is to say tliat they ijossess utility. Second, tliat 

 they are e.rhanstihle, that is to say the supi)]y of them is limited, there 

 not being enough for all. And, third, that tliey are capal)Ie of exclusive 

 appropriation. All things of which those three conditions can be pred- 

 icated are property and nothing which does not unite all those condi- 

 tions can be regarded as i>ro])erty. 



Concerning the first two of these conditions, no debate whatever is 

 necessary. The utili ty of tlie animal is admitted. That they are objects 

 of extreme human desire is conceded. That the supi>ly is Jimited is 

 also conceded. The race is exhaustible. There is not enough for all. 

 The only question, therefore, as to whether they are property or not, 

 must turn upon the determination of the i)oint whether or not they are 

 susceptible of exclusive apiJrojjriation. That is the interesting point in 

 reference to the question wliether seals are property or not. Are they 

 capable of exclusive appropriation by nuin'? 

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