214 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



The extract from a French writer, Toiillier, which follows in a note is 

 so long that I will not read it; but it is to the same effect of marking 

 the distinction between jwftsesslon and ownership^ and showing that 

 ownership is a development in the course of civiUzation of the institu- 

 tion of property, and that ownership at present no longer depends upon 

 actual jjossession at all; it depends upon riglits which the law gives. 

 If the law chooses to stamp the personality of the owner upon any par- 

 ticular piece of property, however large, or however extended, whether 

 it is in his possession, or out of his possession, then that object upon 

 which the law thus stamps the qualitj^ of ownership, is the subject of 

 exclusive appropriation in the law. 



It is the law that does this. Originally property depended much 

 u])on individual effort and the power of individual defence. Now, in 

 the development of civilization, it depends upon law; and whatever the 

 law regards as the subject of exclusive appropriation is to be regarded 

 as property provided it presents the other requisites which I have men- 

 tioned. The inquiry is, therefore, under ivhat ci reran stances and to ichat 

 extent tcill the law stamp the quality of ownership upon thinc/s which either 

 are not possessed, or cannot he actually possessed, by any owner during 

 a considerable ])art of the time. Under what circumstances and to 

 what exteiit will the law assign to a man a title to such things and 

 defend if? That is the interesting question. 



The best way to answer that is to see what the law actually does; 

 and we may take, in the first instance, the case of land. As I have 

 already said, land may be owned by a private individual to any extent. 

 He may own a j^rovince if he can acfjuire it. The law places no limit 

 upon his acquisition and it will defend him in the enjoyment of it. 

 Why is it? As I have already shown, the institution of property does 

 not Vlepend upon any arbitrary reasons, but upon great social reasons 

 and great social necessities; and, therefore, the answer to the question 

 why the law allows an extent of property to be owned by a man which 

 he cannot by any possibility actually possess, must be found in some 

 great social need; and this we quickly see comes from the demands of 

 civilization to satisfy which it is necessary that the fruits of the earth 

 should be increased in order to accommodate the wants of the increas- 

 ing propulation of mankind. No land will be cultivated uidess you 

 award to the individual the product of his labor in cultivating it. The 

 motives of self interest are api)ealed to, and men are told: "You may 

 have, and we will defend your title to, as much land as you can acquire." 

 That is the only way in which the general cultivation of the earth could 

 ever be brought about. That is the only way in wliich it is made to 

 produce the enormous increase which it now produces; and although 

 large tracts of land are not capable of direct actual possession by the 

 owner, yet in view of the prodigious advantages whi(?h are acquired by 

 stamping the character of ownership upon them, the law concedes that 

 ownership, assigns the title to an individual, and protects and defends 

 him in it. 



The same is the case in reference to all movable property, all ]>roducts 

 of manufacture and of labor — agricultural implements and tools, goods 

 of all descriptions. A man may own magazines full of them Avhich lie 

 cannot by any possibility, bv his individual arm, protect and defend. 

 Why is he pernutted to do this? Because the world cannot otherwise 

 have them They are the price which the world must necessarily pay 

 for these i)ossessions, or otherwise it must do without t li eni ; and it cannot 

 do without them and support the population which civilization brings 

 upon the earth. 



