21G ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



There are some animals wbicli lie near tlieboundarj^ line between tlie 

 wild and tame, and it is very interesting to see Low tlie law deals with 

 these, and how perfectly in accordance with the princijde I am endeav- 

 oring to sustain. Take the case of bees ; they are ])erfe(*tly wild. Noth- 

 ing can be wilder. Eevertheless man can induce them to return to a 

 particular spot; and in consequence of that can take from the bees their 

 liroduct, and can therefore increase the production of honey, — a most 

 useful article — to an almost indefiiiite extent. If men were driven for 

 their supply of honey to find the hives of wild bees in the forest, their 

 demand could never be supplied, and the bees themselves would 

 be taken away; but if you award a i)roperty to man in such bees as 

 may take up their abode in the hives prepared for them; permit him to 

 defend his title to them, and to every swarm that, at the appropriate 

 season, leaves in order to create a new habitation for itself — if you give 

 him a title to such bees, enable him to practice a husbandry, allow him 

 to consider as exclusively appropriated to himself what in its own nature 

 is absolutely incapal)le of appropriation, — if the law will step in to the 

 aid of human intirmity and grant these rights — then you can have this 

 product of honey nuiltiplied to an indefinite extent. Society does it. 

 It does it for that i)urpose. Our municipal law which I have heretofore 

 shown upon this point is based upon this ground. 



The same is true of the wild geese and swans. The breeding of these 

 is an industry, to be sure, not carried on on so large a scale, but it pre- 

 sents the same principles. If we were driven for our supply of such 

 birds to pursue the wild flocks with such means as are adapted for that 

 purpose, the supply procurable would be extremely small; but if man 

 by art and industry can so far reclaim them as to wont them to a par- 

 ticular place, take the annual increase from them and preserve the stock, 

 then, without taking from others, we greatly multiply the product which 

 is applicable to the uses of man. In other words, another like occasion 

 is furnished itpon which the law will lend its aid to man, and say that 

 these animals shall be deemed exclusively a])propriated; and it does so. 

 And yet for the greater part of the time these animals are roaming in 

 waters uot belonging to their owner and would fly from him as quickly as 

 from others, should he attempt to capture them there. 



The case of deer upon which I have already enlarged is the same. 

 Pigeons the same. The reindeer of Lapland is another instance of an 

 animal naturally wild, but in which the law assigns to man a property 

 interest and deems them exclusive property although they wander over 

 vast regions, and, instead of following their owners, I believe the 

 owners follow them. 



Now we see the principle which lies at the foundation of the municipal 

 law which I alluded to in the early part of my argument, the municipal 

 law of all civilized nations concurring upon these points, and declaring 

 in regard to every one of these animals commonly designated as wihl, 

 that if man can so deal with them as to take their ajinual increase and 

 preserve the stock, then, notwithstanding they may fly out of his pos- 

 session at will, still, the law will regard them as subjects of exclusive 

 appropriation. 



But the law does not stop there. It is interesting to observe that it 

 will go to all extremities, wherever there is a social advantage to be 

 gained, and will allow a thing to be the subject of property and to be 

 regarded as the subject of exclusive ap])ropriation, althougli it is abso 

 \ntely intangible. Take patents for useful inventions, products of the 

 mind, and, originally, not the subjects of property at all. As society 

 advances, as civilization develops, as the need of these products of the 



