ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 227 



tlie institution of ijroperty performs. Therefore there is no difliculty 

 in awarding- to the United States a right of property subject to the 

 right of the Indians to capture in the manner in which they were for- 

 merly accustomed to do before the use of vessels for pelagic sealing, 

 but not the right to go out in pelagic sealing vessels. 



The President. Do you not think it is very difficult to draw a legal 

 line of limitation between what an Indian is allowed to do for himself, 

 and what he may be allowed or permitted to do in the service of an 

 European or civilized man ? 



Mr. Carter. There are always practical difficulties connected with 

 the dealings with barbaric tribes. There are always greater or less diffi- 

 culties; but there are no insuperable difficulties connected with it. 



The President. Do you tind there is a substantial legal difference 

 between the two cases. 



Mr. Carter. There is a substantial difference. 



The President. Between the case of an Indian fishing on his own 

 account and an Indian fisliing on the account of a civilized man? 



Mr. Carter. I think tiiere is a very substantial one. 



The President. A substantial legal difference? 



Mr. Carter. Yes; I think so. When I speak of legal, I mean moral 

 or international grounds. There is no sharp distinction. 



The President. Moral and international are two different fields of 

 discussion, I think, though they may often join. 



Mr. Carter. Not so diiferent as may be supposed. 



The President. They are not contrary. 



Mr. Carter. Not so different as may be supposed. International 

 law rests upon natural law, and natural law is all moral. The law of 

 nature is all moral; and it is a great part of international law. If the 

 dictates of the law of nature are not repelled by any actual usage of 

 men, then they must be allowed to have their effect, and the dictates 

 of the law of nature are the dictates of international law. To say that 

 they are moral does not distinguish them at all from such as are legal. 

 We have sharp distinctions, of course, in municipal law between what 

 is moral and what is legal, but in international law whatever relates to 

 actual human concerns, the property of nations, and actual affairs, 

 whatever is dictated in respect to these by the law of nature, is not 

 only the moral law, but the legal law also. 



There is the broadest sort of difference between the two cases. The 

 Indiim goes out and attacks and kills the seals for the purpose of sus- 

 taining himself, making a skin which he is going to wear, and getting 

 food to eat. 



Lord Hannen. Is it to be confined to merely their sustenance? 

 Were they not the only suppliers of the skins in the first instance? 

 They bartered the skins, for there was no other source until the Pri- 

 bylof Islands were discovered. That trading so frequently referred to 

 was a trading in these, amongst other skins. 



Mr. Carter. That is true; they were original traders. They were 

 made use of for the purposes of commerce. But that was commerce. 



Lord Hannen. Yes; carried on by the natives. 



Mr. Carter. But it was commerce. They were supplying the com- 

 merce of the world. They were not furnishing themselves with cloth- 

 ing. They were not furnishing themselves with seals for food. 



The President. That you consider was allowed at the time, and 

 ' would not be allowed now. 



Mr. Carter. Before the Eussians discovered these regions, they 

 were inhabited by Indians, and those Indians did pursue the seals in 



