ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 247 



itself by an act of necessary force in time of peace — a thing that an 

 individual may do in civil society, a nation cannot do; and cannot do 

 wlien there is no other means of protecting itself! Of course it must 

 be instantly perceived that if this power of defending itself and its 

 property from injury against the citizens of other nations, is something 

 which a nation cannot exercise in time of peace — if that is true — the 

 assertion that it has any rights at all is mere empty sound. A right 

 that cannot be defended amounts to nothing. I would like to have 

 those who assert that a nation cannot defend itself and its property in 

 time of peace by acts of necessary self-defence, tell me how it can defend 

 them. I hope they will be able to tell me. If a nation cannot defend 

 its admitted and conceded rights in that way, I hope they will be able 

 to point out some way in which those rights can be defended and pro- 

 tected. 



But there is no truth in the assertion that the exercise by a nation of 

 the right of self-defence, by the employment of acts of necessary force, 

 is confined to times of war. There is no substance in that. The right 

 exists in time of peace just as well. Whenever the necessity arises, 

 the right arises, whether it be in time of war or time of peace. It may 

 arise in peace just as much as in war. In point of fact the principal 

 occasions, and the most frequent occasions, for the exercise of this right 

 happen to occur in time of war, and, therefore, the instances in which it 

 is exercised and the rules which govern its exercise are found in bellig-^ 

 erent conditions far more than in conditions of peace. The absence of 

 the occasion is the reason why we find less discussion of these rights in 

 time of peace, and a want of rules for regulating them ; but nevertheless 

 the occasion may arise, and when it does arise, then the power must be 

 put in force. 



Now, let me call the attention of the Tribunal to occasions when it 

 does arise in times of peace. In the first place, let me allude to those 

 municipal regulations which are devised by different states for the pur- 

 pose of protecting their revenue. I before remarked that the protection 

 of the revenue of a nation could not well be effective unless the conduct 

 of foreign vessels could be controlled at a greater distance than three 

 miles from the land. If a vessel intending a breach of the revenue laws 

 of a nation had the power to approach its shores to a distance of three 

 miles from the land, and wait outside of that limit for a favorable oppor- 

 tunity to slip in, or to unload its cargo into another vessel sent 

 clandestinely from the shore, it might at all times evade its revenue 

 laws, and, consequently, most nations — certainly Great Britain and the 

 United States— Great Britain from a very early period and the United 

 States almost from the period of her independence — have enacted laws 

 prohibiting vessels from transshipping goods or hovering at a distance 

 much greater than that of three miles — three or four leagues from the 

 shore being the area commonly fixed upon. What is the penalty which 

 they denounce for that purpose? The penalty is capture and confisca- 

 tion. Does that penalty, and the enforcement of that penalty involve 

 an extension of jurisdiction out to that limit of three or four leagues? 

 Certainly not. It is an act of self-defence. It is an executive act, 

 designed to protect the revenue interests of the country. So also in the 

 case of colonial trade, a similar device was formerly adopted for the 

 purpose of preventing the approach of vessels in the. neighborhood of 

 the colonies of another country, for the purpose of engaging in illicit 

 trade with such colonies. In order to enforce such prohibitions, it was 

 necessary that regulations should be adopted prohibiting vessels from 

 hovering off the coasts. Consequently, if a vessel appeared off" the 



