ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 253 



can punisJi the officers and crew of such vessel. That would be le.c^is- 

 latiug for the high seas. We do not ask for a decision that the United 

 States can make a law and enforce it, by which she could condemn a 

 vessel that had been engaged at some ^>«sif time in pelagic sealing, if 

 the vessel was not so engaged at the time of seizure. The doctrine 

 maintained by us simply amounts to this, that whenever a vessel is 

 caught red Iv.inded, flagrante delictu, in pelagic sealing, the Government 

 of the United States has the right to seize her and capture her; that is 

 to say, it has the right to employ necessary force for the purpose of 

 protecting, in the only way in which it can protect, its property in the 

 seals, or its property interest in the industry which it maintains upon 

 the islands. That is the extent of our claim. 



If the United States cannot protect their property in that way, how 

 is it possible for them to protect it at all. My argument assumes, of 

 course, that I have been successful in showing that the United States 

 has a property interest in these seals wherever they are, and, upon the 

 high seas, as well as upon the land; or, if not that, that it has a prop- 

 erty interest in the industry which it carries on at the Pribilof Islands, 

 which they are entitled to protect. The practice of pelagic sealing, we 

 have shown, is destructive of both, and is a ivrong in itself. The 

 United States cruiser finds a vessel actually engaged in destroying 

 these seals, the property of the United States. She warns her off — 

 commands her to desist from the trespass in which she is engaged. 

 Suppose the vessel refuses, what is to be done then? Is the cruiser to 

 allow her to proceed in the execution of her tresjiass, stay by her, follow 

 her into some port, and there, in the name of the United States, seek 

 redress in the municipal tribunals? 



Is the remedy of the United States limited to that? That, of course, 

 would be wholly ineffective; and if it were effective in any degree, or 

 in any instance, it would require the entire navy of the United States 

 to carry it fully out. You would require a ship of war for every pelagic 

 sealer. That, of course, would be absolutely ineffective; nor would it 

 comport with the dignity of a nation. No nation has ever yet conde- 

 scended, in the defence and protection of its rights upon the high seas, 

 to wait until it could resort to the municipal tribunal of some power 

 and there seek to obtain such justice as might be afforded. 



One other resort might be suggested. It might be said that the 

 Government of the United States might make the conduct of these 

 Canadian pelagic sealers under such circumstances the subject of com- 

 plaint to Great Britain herself. What should it say to Great Britain"? 

 Ask her to prohibit this conduct? How could Great Britain prohibit it? 

 Only by employing a part of her fleet to do it. Is it the business of 

 one nation to furnish a force to protect rights of another nation? 

 Would not the prompt answer of Great Britain under such circum- 

 stances be: "This is not our act; we do not adopt these acts of the 

 Canadian sealers; we agree that you have a property in these seals; we 

 do not command, encourage, or in any manner assist, the action of these 

 pelagic sealers; if they are trespassing upon the rights of the United 

 States, is that nation so feeble that it cannot defend itself upon the 

 high seas?" What reply could the United States make to such a 

 response as that? 



No; there is no way in which a nation can protect its rights upon the 

 high seas other than by the employment of force — force employed as an 

 individual would employ it; force not derived from any law whatever, 

 but force derived from the fact that the nation has a right upon which 

 some one is tresiDassiug, a trespass which the nation cannot i)revent in 



