256 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 



■which it would be jtossible to prevent it, namely by the capture of the vessel; and 

 that it can uiake no ditierence whether such vessel be three, or four, or more, miles 

 from such islands; and that if such capture can be made anywhere within four miles 

 of said islands, it may lawfully be made at any distance from the islands whore such 

 right may be invaded, in the same manner. 



"l^'onrte'enth. The United States insists that it would have the right last above men- 

 tioned without passing any municipal law, or adopting any municipal regulation, to 

 secure it, or to govern its exercise; but it, at the same time, suj)])oses that the pas- 

 sago of a law regulating the exercise of such right and providing for a mode of con- 

 demnation of vessels seized, would be entirely proper, and one of its reasonable 

 duties. That it would serve the same just purposes as are answered by ]»r'ze laws, 

 namely, to give the citizens of other nations notice and warning of its intentions, 

 regulate the conduct of seizing officers, prevent injustice and oppression, and inform 

 the government, and other governments, respecting the regularity of any seizure, to 

 the end that, if rightlnl, it should be adopted by the United States, and acquiesced 

 in by other governments which might be interested; and, if otherwise, be repudiated 

 and 'made the subject for just reparation. 



Fifteenth. In respect to the seizures actually made and decrees of condemnation 

 thereon, the United States ])erceivesnoparticidar in which theyare irregular, unjust, 

 or not defensible as an exercise of the right of necessary self-defence. It does not 

 defend any sentence of tine and imprisonment imposed upon any citizens of other 

 nations for engaging in pelagic sealing; but insists that any invalidity with which 

 such sentences may be affected, has no tendency to impair the validity of a condem- 

 nation otherwise valid. 



Sixteenth. The familiar law of piracy illustrates and confirms the foregoing con- 

 clusions. The general consent of nations has sanctioned the practice of the arrest, 

 trial, and sentence of pirates, even when they have not invaded any right of the 

 nation so dealing with them, or its citizens, either of person or property. Pirates 

 are every where justiciable. This is an exceptional instance in which nations are 

 permitted to defend the general order, security, and peace of the seas. But it cannot 

 be doubted that, irrespective of such general consent, and had it never been given, 

 any nation would have the right to defend one of its own ships from capture by 

 pirates, and, in the course of such defence, and as a part of it, to capture the piratical 

 vessel and condemn it by proceedings in its own courts. 



Seventeenth. The Government of the United States, therefore, bases its claim to 

 defend its projierty interest in the seal herd and in its industry maintained upon 

 the Pribilof Islands by such force exerted upon the high seas as may be reasonably 

 necessary to that end upon the followings grounds: 



1. The' reason and necessity of the thing, there being no other means adequate to 

 the defense of such rights. 



2. Tlie iiractice and usage of nations which always employ this means of defence. 



Those, tlien, are the grounds upon which the United States asserts 

 its right to the employment of reasonable force. If it has a property 

 in tlie seals, that property is invaded wlicnever they are attacked by 

 pelagic sealers, and that property interest in the seals themselves, and 

 the necessity of defending it give the United States the right to pre- 

 vent that practice by the arrest and seizure of the guilty vessel. If it 

 should be decided that it has not a property interest in the seals them- 

 selves, but has a property interest in the industry which it maintains 

 upon the Pribilof Islands — a rightful, lawful and useful industry — then 

 its right to arrest the lu-actice of pelagic sealing upon the sea does not 

 depend upon a property interest in the seals but upon the fact that that 

 practice is an essential wrong, and is, besides, an invasion of the right- 

 ful industry which the United States carries on upon the laud. To 

 justify that act of pelagic sealing, it is necessary to show that it is in 

 itself a right, and if that were shown, then the United States would 

 have no right to interfere with it; but if it is in itself a u-rong — if, upon 

 the fundamental and iimnutable distinctions between right and wrong 

 everywliere prevalent, upon the sea as well as ui)on the land, that act 

 of destroying a useful race of animals is not defensible as a right, then, 



