ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER, ESQ. 261 



the disposition to be made of that question depends upon the condition 

 in which the subject is left after the decision of the ,/ive questions. For 

 instance, if we proceed upon the view tliat the Language referred to 

 relates to the first four questions only, and those should be decided 

 against the United States, it will be necessary for the Tribunal to con- 

 sider what regulations are necessary; but, should the decision of the 

 fifth question be at the same time in fovor of the United States, the 

 conclusion upon such consideration might be that no regnlations were 

 in fact necessary. Such would perhaps be the conclusion if the 

 Tribunal should be of the opinion that the possession of a property 

 interest would give the United States the power to protect it by the 

 employment of force upon the high seas; but if the Tribunal should 

 hold, contrary to my argument, that the possession of that interest 

 would not give tlie right to employ force to prevent pelagic sealing, 

 then concurrent regulations would become necessary. 



On the other hand, if the language referred to be taken to include 

 nil of the five questions, the fifth question being regarded as one relat- 

 ing to jurisdiction in the sense which 1 have indicated, the subject will 

 be left in such a condition that the concurrence of Great Britain in 

 regulations will be necessary, provided the Tribunal should be of opin- 

 ion either that the United States had no property interest, or that such 

 interest gave no right to em])loy force in its protection. 



Therefore I shall not engage in any further discussion of this ques- 

 tion of interpretation. It is practically of no consequence. 



What shall be the regulations for the preservation of the seals'? I 

 must now assume the subject to be left in such a condition that it is 

 necessary that regulations of this character should be contrived "? What 

 are their requirements? There are two qualifications mentioned in the 

 Treaty, and two only. In the first place, they must be regulations 

 operative outside of the jurisdictional limits of the two Governments. 

 In other words, the field of their operation is to be on the high seas 

 alone. 



That is one condition. The only other description that we have of 

 them is, that they shall be such as are necessary for the preservation of 

 the seals. Fitness for the accomplishment of that end is the require- 

 ment, and that is an absolute requirement of these regulations. But 

 right there I am met by some intimations, in the Case and in the printed 

 Argument on the part of Great Britain, that a somewhat different inter- 

 pretation may be set up, and that some limitations will be sought to be 

 imposed upon the regulations which may be recommended by this Tri- 

 bunal. In the first place, it is intimated that they must be regulations 

 conditioned upon the consent of other nations than Great Britain and 

 the United States, and not operative until the consent of the other 

 powers shall be obtained. I am not exactly certain, but I gather from 

 what is contained in the Case and the printed Argument on the part of 

 Great Britain, that that ground may be taken. It cannot be maintained. 



In the first place, it is not expressed in the Treaty. No such limita- 

 tion is expressed there; and the omission to express it is in itself 

 significant, because the subject of the consent of other powers is 

 mentioned, and there is an engagement at the close of the article, as 

 follows: " The High Contracting Parties furthermore agree to cooper- 

 ate in securing the adhesion of other powers to such regulations." 

 That language of itself excludes any implication that the operation of 

 the regulations is to be conditioned upon the assent of other powers. 

 It assumes that they are to be in operation ; and that it will be a matter 

 of utility, of convenience, that the assent of other powers shall be 



