ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK R. COUDERT, ESQ. 293 



As for fisliino;, though it hfith much more abundant subject in the sea than in 

 lakes or rivers, yet 'tis manifest tliat it may in part be exliansted, and that if all 

 liationa should desire such right and liberty near the coast of any particular 

 Country, that country must be very much prejudiced in this respect; especially 

 since 'tis very usual that some ])articular kind of fish, or perhaps some more 

 precious commodity, as pearls, coral, and)er, or the like, are to be found only in one 

 part of the sea, and that of no considerable extent. In this case there is no reason 

 why the borderers should not rather challenge to themselves this happiness of a 

 wealthy shore or sea than those who are seated at a distance from it. 



"The various uses of tlie sea," says Vattel, "near the coasts render 

 it very susceptible of property. It furnishes fish, shells, pearls, 

 amber, etc.; now in all these respects its use is not inexhaustible. 

 Wherefore, the nation to whom the coasts belong may appropriate to 

 themselves and convert to their own i)rofit, an advantage which nature 

 has so placed within their reach as to enable them conveniently to take 

 possession of it, in the same manner as they possess themselves of the 

 doTninion of the land they inhabit. Who can doubt that the pearl 

 fisheries of Bahrein and Ceylon may lawfully become ])roperty "?" 



We do not doubt it; we do not disimte it; although we do dispute, 

 as Mr. Carter has stated, the grounds upon which that title is asserted 

 and that right is supposed to rest. 



"And though, where the catch of fish is the only object, the fishery 

 appears less liable to be exhausted, yet if a nation have on their coasts 

 a particular fishery of a i)rofitable nature, of which they shall become 

 masters, shall they not be permitted to approi)riate to themselves that 

 bounteous gift of nature as an appendage to the country they possess.'' 



Is not that precisely our case'? Is not this "an appendage to the 

 country we possess"? If not, what is it"? Does it not depend upon 

 the country we possess? Is not the very condition of its existence 

 dependent upon that country? Do not the United States hold the lile 

 of the seal in their hand upon that territory? Is it not then in every 

 sense of the word an appendage to the territory that we hold? So it 

 is with Ceylon, and so it is with these coral fisheries which have been 

 mentioned; they are all marine industries connected with the territory 

 of the nation, and for that reason conceded by general consent and by 

 international law to those nations whether it be to Italy, or to England 

 or to France : 



A nation may appropriate to herself those things of which the free and common 

 use would be prejudicial or dangei'ous to her. 



Can anything be more explicit upon this point? The common use 

 would be prt^judicial and dangerous to the United States — not only 

 prejudicial but fatal to the United States — so far as its industry is 

 concerned. 



This is a second reason for which governments extend their dominion 

 over the sea along their coasts, as far as they are able to protect their 

 right. 



If the Court please. I was proceeding to read further from Mr. Phelps' 

 argument an extract which I deem most nuiterial; but it is well to 

 preface it with the reflection that the seal exists to-day simply because 

 we refrained from its slaughter. History has shown, and we know, 

 precisely what would become of the seal of the north because we have 

 the experience of the past. As Mr. Buckle has said, the oftlce and 

 function of history is to teach us from the study of the past what will 

 happen in the future; and we know that indiscriminate slaughter on 

 laud is tatal to the race. The vacant seal rookeries of the South tell 

 the story in the strongest and most eloquent terms. In one year when 



