INSANITY AND CRIME. 579 



to regulate criminal jurisprudence, that I have little doubt, 

 should the points to which it relates come before a Superior 

 Court in any of the British dominions for consideration in 

 Banco, they will be decided in accordance with Sir James 

 Stephen's views. How closely these approximate on this 

 matter to those of Dr. Maudsl^y appears on comparing them 

 with the following extract from the prefece to the work of 

 that gentleman which I have already quoted. He says 

 (pp. V. and vi.) — "The writer" (of an article in the Pall 

 Mall Gazette) " does not in his consideration of the 

 criticism which I have ventured to make upon the legal 

 criterion of responsibility defend it as it stands at present ; 

 he would not, however, supersede it, but would make an 

 addition to it, by including in the judicial statement from to 

 do or to abstain from doing an act as well as knowledge of 

 the nature and quality of the act. But therein lies the 

 essence of the dispute ; that once granted, nothing more need 

 be asked, and there would be an instant end of the battle." 



As Sir James Stephen made a careful study of Dr. 

 Maudsley's work before writing his own, the latter gentle- 

 man may, I think, be fairly credited with having helped to 

 elicit fi'om a legal authority of the highest eminence an 

 elucidation of the law which will probably have the effect of 

 causing judges in their charges to juries to give more pro- 

 minence to the importance of ascertaining the presence or 

 absence of the power of self-control than they had previously 

 done, and to direct them, where they find that by reason of 

 mental disease the prisoner could not control his action, to 

 find a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity. 



And when we consider what is the true basis of the right 

 of the community to punish for crimes, the existence of the 

 power of self-control appears to be absolutely essential to 

 criminal responsibility. In iny opinion this right rests 

 entirely upon the right of the community to protect itself. 

 It is impossible for the law or its ministers to award punish- 

 ment according to the moral guilt of the offender. To say 

 nothing of the old and interminable controversy on the 

 question whether there is such a thing as free will at all, it 

 cannot be denied that hereditary temperament, circumstances, 

 and education have a most important bearing upon the moral 

 guilt of offenders, which yet cannot be estimated with any 

 approach to precision. No doubt the judge who sentences a 

 prisoner is sometimes more reprehensible in his whole life 

 from a moral point of view than the poor wretch whom he 



