On Definitions. 31 



of situation. If all things remained constantly in the same situation, 

 no verbs would be used. We require them to indicate that some- 

 thing has undergone a change. Thus the phrases, to fall, to rise, 

 to strike, to build, to sail, to reward, to see, and all verbs whatever, 

 imply some event or change of situation. Even the verb to be, the 

 least active of all, it might seem, would never be used, if no change 

 had taken place. We should never say, " it is cold/' if it had not 

 previously been warm. All the original verbs denoting natural 

 events, occurring in a primitive situation, must have had their mean- 

 ing fixed by convention between the parties, upon actual perception 

 of the event. But, in the progress of society, a great number of 

 verbs are introduced, which imply complex actions, and may be ex- 

 plained by a combination of other simpler words. Of this kind are 

 such words as to liberate, to cultivate, to obtain, to navigate, to pa- 

 cify, to govern. Such phrases as these may be, and commonly are, 

 explained by the use of other and simpler words, which simpler 

 words have originally had their meaning settled by convention, and 

 upon the actual inspection of the event. 



We come next to a class of objects, of which the names cannot 

 have their meaning determined in same manner with those we have 

 hitherto contemplated. Their meaning must indeed be determined 

 by convention, but it cannot be brought about by the actual view or 

 perception of the things themselves, for they are not objects of sense. 

 It will easily be seen that I allude to the feelings of the mind. Our 

 feelings of pleasure or pain, of grief or joy, of hope or fear; our 

 thoughts, our recollections, our contemplations, our resolutions, are 

 objects of sense to no living being. To ourselves they are the ob- 

 jects of consciousness, not of sense. They are not objects of per- 

 ception. 



How then are the two persons whom we supposed to meet with- 

 out any previous knowledge of names, to agree in their names of 

 these invisible objects ? How are they to mention to each other 

 their hopes, their desires, their preferences, their remembrances, 

 since they have no names for such things, nor any means of fixing 

 by agreement upon any names for objects which they cannot com- 

 pare ? They cannot place the object before their eyes, or any of 

 their senses, and say, here is the object to which I give this or the 





other 



name. 



And I may observe in passing, that here is an everlasting barrier 

 to the knowledge of those who assert, as is now confidently done, 



