On Definitions. 89 
One of the maxims handed down from the early ages of the 
Greeks, said to have been first delivered by Pittacus, was (Ivaé 
xaupde, occasionem cognosce,) observe, or act according to the occasion, 
This maxim, if fairly interpreted, seems to imply, that our conduct 
and behavior ought to be suited to the occasion before us, that is, 
in fact, to the circumstances in which we are placed, which circum- 
stances, are indeed the very causes why we are required toact. It 
is impossible, therefore, that any advice can be more proper, or more 
salutary, if fully acted on. Yet, by a very slight change in the mode of 
viewing the precept, it may be understood in a totally different sense; 
it may be considered as sanctioning the practice of a time-server, 
the most despicable of all characters, as studying to render every 
change of circumstances, by every means in his power, subservient 
to his immediate and personal interests. 
The more celebrated maxim, (Dvcids osaulév,) know thyself, ap- 
pears much less exceptionable, and is perhaps less liable to miscon- 
struction than any rule that can be given. Yet even this has been 
found subject, or at least, thought to be subject to misconception. 
How often is it observed of persons of either sex, that they would 
be better characters, that is, more observant of their moral duties, 
if they knew less of the superiority of their personal qualities? 
This is one aspect in which the precept would seem to be wrong, 
though i in reality the error is only apparent ; for the knowledge which 
is blamed, or thought hurtful in such persons, is only a partial 
knowledge of detntlred and its ill effects would be entirely obvi- 
ated by a fuller acquaintance with every thing that can be compre- 
hended under the complex term, themselves. — 
o rule in morals is of more extensive application, or more useful 
in practice, than that which requires us to hold sacred the property 
of another. The general application of this rule is obvious and 
extremely easy. Yet no rule has given rise to such innumerable 
questions, and we daily see hundreds of disputes arise out of this 
subject, which give occasion to the most serious contestations, and 
which nothing but superior authority, joined with superior 
can decide. Many of the questions that arise out of this very gen- 
eral rule, are of so vague and intricate a nature, that, nothing but 
an arbitrary rule, applicable to all the cases that fall under it, can 
serve the purpose of guiding the actions of mankind in regard: to 
them. For example, whether the pipene of any literary work 
or invention, shall continue to be the author’s or inventor’s, for 
Vou. XXXI.—No. 1. a. 
