BRITISH ASSOCIATION, MEETING AT EXETER. 287 
even the last link of the chain; a stage where further progress is un- 
attainable, and we can only refer the highest law at which we stopped 
to the fiat of an Almighty Power. To assume the contrary as a 
matter of necessity is, practically, to remove the First Cause of all to 
an infinite distance from us. The boundary, however, between what 
is clearly known and what is veiled in impenetrable darkness is not 
ordinarily thus sharply defined. Between the two there lies a misty 
region, in which loom the ill-discerned forms of links of the chain 
which are yet beyond ns. But the general principle is not affected 
thereby. Let us fearlessly trace the dependence of link on link as far 
as it may be given to us to trace it, but let us take heed that in thus 
studying second causes we forget not the First Cause, nor shut our 
eyes to the wonderful proofs of desigu which, in the study of organized 
beings especially, meet us at every turn. 
Wholesome Effects of Scientific Inquiry. 
Truth, we know, must be self-consistent, nor can one truth contra- 
dict another, even though the two may have been arrived at by totally 
different processes,—iu the one case, suppose, obtained by sound 
scientific investigation, in the other case taken on trust from duly 
authenticated witnesses.  Misinterpretations of course there may be 
on the one side or on the other, causing apparent contradictions. 
Every mathematician knows that in his private work he will occa- 
sionally by two different trains of reasoning arrive at discordant con- 
clusions. He is at once aware that there must be a slip somewhere, 
and sets himself to detect and correct it. When conclusions rest on 
probable evidence, the reconciling of apparent contradictions is not so 
simple and certain. It requires the exercise of a calm, unbiassed 
judgment, capable of looking at both sides of the question; and often- 
times we have long to suspend our decision, and seek for further 
evidence. None need fear the effect of scientific inquiry carried on in 
an honest, truth-loving, humble spirit, which makes us no less ready 
frankly to avow our ignorance of what we cannot explain than to 
accept conclusions based on sound evidence. The slow but sure path 
of induction is open to us. Let us frame hypotheses if we will: most 
useful are they when kept in their proper place, as stimulating inquiry. 
Let us seek to confront them with observation and experiment, thereby 
confirming or upsetting them as the result may prove; but let us 
