CALIFORNIA FISH AND GAME. 77 



held that the statute both did and lawfully could prohibit such a sale, and that while 

 the law was of course intended only for the protection of the game of this state, the 

 intention was to accomplish that very end by prohibiting the sale wherever game was 

 in fact obtained, and that such a law was reasonably adapted to that end. All state 

 laws reasonably looking to this end have consistently been maintained by the courts, 

 the theory being that the ownership of the sovereign authority being in "trust for all 

 the people of the state, it is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best 

 preserve the subject of the trust and leave the beneficial use in future to the people 

 of the state. In Gecr vs. k^tatv of Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, the Supreme Court of 

 the United States upheld a statute of Connecticut which forbade the transportation 

 without the state of game lawfully killed or taken within the state, or the having of 

 such game in one's possession with the intent to procure its transportation beyond 

 the state. In Ex parte Kenneke, 136 Cal. 527, a statute prohibiting the buying or 

 selling of quail was upheld by this court. The court, through Mr. Justice McFar- 

 land, said: "Wild game belongs to the whole people, and the legislature may dis- 

 pose of it as may seem to it best, subject only to constitutional limitations against 

 discrimination. Within those limitations the legislature, for the purpose of protect- 

 ing game, may pass such laws as to it seem most wise ; and the measures best 

 adapted to that end are for the legislature to determine, and courts can not review 

 its discretion." It was held that the law did not destroy a right of property, the 

 court approvingly quoting from American Express Co. vs. State, 133 111. 649, as 

 follows : "The fallacy of the position consists in the supposition that the person who 

 may kill quail has an absolute property in the dead animals. * * * rpj^g legis- 

 lature has the right to permit persons to kill or take game upon such terms and 

 conditions as its wisdom might dictate, and that the person killing game might have 

 such property interest in it, and such only, as the legislature might confer. * * * 

 The person killing quail under this statute has but a qualified property in the birds 

 after they are killed. * * * gyj jjjg j^^ which authorized him to" kill the quail 

 has withheld the right to sell or the right to ship for the purpose of sale, and when 

 such person undertakes to ship for sale he is undertaking to assert a right not con- 

 ferred by law. The act, therefore, does not destroy a right of property, because no 

 such right exists." In State vs. Rodman, 5S Minn. 393. it was said that the legis- 

 lature may adopt reasonable regulations not only as to the time and manner in which 

 game may be taken and killed, "but also imposing limitations upon the right of 

 property in such game after it has been reduced to possession." It was further said 

 that such legislation deprives no person of his property, because the person reduces 

 game to possession "subject to such conditions and limitations as the legislature has 

 seen fit to provide." (See, also, Silz vs. Uesterherg, 211 U. S. 31.) Such has been 

 the uniform course of decision. We are, of course, speaking of regulations which 

 may reasonably be held by the legislature to look to the preservation of the game of 

 the state for the beneficial use of the people of the state. The person taking or killing 

 game, takes or kills subject to the limitations of any such reasonable regulation by 

 the state, and his right of property therein is qualified thereby. We can see no good 

 ground for a claim that regulations subjecting such game to inspection by state officers 

 when offered for shipment or when in course of transportation under shipment for the 

 purpose of enabling illegal takings to be illegally taken, are in any way an unreason- 

 able exercise of the power of the legislature in this behalf. Whatever rights the 

 shipper has in game shipped by him are subject to these regulations, as are neces- 

 sarily the rights of the transportation company and the consignee. And the same 

 thing is necessarily true of the law here involved prohibiting the shipping of game 

 by parcel post. It is a reasonable complement of the regulations as to inspection, 

 without which the inspection in course of transportation could be had only as to such 

 game as is shipped by some other means than the United States mail. The person 

 having game in his possession which he desires to ship, acquires and holds it subject 

 to the condition that he will not ship it by parcel post, and no property right in such 

 game is violated by a law which makes it a crime for him to do so. We are entirely 

 at a loss to see how a person's property right to use the United States mail for all 

 lawful purposes is violated by a law which prohibits his use thereof for the purpose 

 of transmitting property which he has acquired and holds subject to the condition 

 that he shall not so transmit it. 



The case of Ex parte Knapp, 127 Cal. 101 (involving the question of the validity of 

 a count]! ordinance') relied on by learned counsel for petitioner in this connection is 

 sufficiently distinguished as to such a case as this by what was said by the court in 

 E.r parte Knniekc, snjrra, as follows: "There is no question in the case at bar as to 

 the reasonableness of an ordinance as in Ex parte Knapp, 127 Cal. 101, and other 

 cases cited ; the provision attacked here is a law of the state passed by the legis- 

 lature." 



The claim that the state law here involved is an unauthorized regulation of inter- 

 state commerce is, we think, fully answered by decisions of the United States Supreme 

 Court, the final arbiter on this question. A similar claim was made in Geer vs. 

 State of Connecticut, supra, and held to be without foundation. The court, through 

 its present chief justice, after exhaustively discussing the question of property in wild 



