78 CALIFORNIA FISH AND GAME. 



game, said : "The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the 

 state of a police power to that end which may be none the less efficiently called into 

 play, because by doing so interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected. 

 * * * The exercise by the state of such power therefore comes directly within the 

 principle of Plumley vs. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 401, 473. The power of the state 

 to protect by adequate police regulations its people against the adulteration of articles 

 of food (which was in that case maintained), although in doing so commerce might 

 be remotely affected, necessarily carries with it the existence of a like power to pre- 

 serve a food supply which belongs to all the people of the state, which can only become 

 the subject of ownership in a qualified way, and tvhich can never he the subject of 

 commerce except with the consent of the state and subject to conditions which it 

 may deem best to impose for the public good." [The italics are ours.] In another 

 portion of the opinion the court speaks of the "consequent power of the state to 

 follow such property into whatever hands it might pass with the conditions and 

 restrictions deemed necessary for the public interest." In the later case of Sih vs. 

 Hesterberg, supra, a similar claim was made, and the court held that the law (one 

 prohibiting the possession of wild game during the close season, whether killed within 

 or without the state) was not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, 

 but only indirectly and remotely affected the operations of commerce, and was of 

 obligatory force upon citizens within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. The 

 court said : "That a state may not pass laws directly regulating foreign or interstate 

 commerce has frequently been held in the decisions of the court. But while this is 

 true, it has also been held in repeated instances that laws passed by the states in the 

 exercise of their police power, not in conflict with laws of Congress upon the same 

 subject, and indirectly or remotely affecting interstate commerce, are nevertheless 

 valid'laws." It is sought to draw a distinction between these cases and the statute 

 here involved, in that our laws permit the shipment beyond the borders of the state 

 of game killed within the state, thus making game, it is said, "articles of interstate 

 commerce." We do not consider the distinction material. The difliculty Avith the 

 argument is that we have not made wild game an article of interstate commei'ce in the 

 full and unrestricted sense. For so long as it remains within this state, at least, it 

 remains burdened with the conditions imposed for the purpose of protecting the game 

 of the state, to the effect that it may be shipped only in certain ways. As to this the 

 language of Mr. Chief Justice White in Gcer vs. Connectictit, supra, that such 

 game "can never be the subject of commerce except with the consent of the state 

 and. subject to conditions which, it may deem best to impose for the public pood" is 

 specially pertinent. Our own case of Ex parte Maicr, supra, is also in point to the 

 effect that there is in our law no unwarranted interference with interstate commerce. 

 The principles controlling the determination of the question just discussed are 

 equally applicable to the claim that the state law here involved is an unlawful inter- 

 ference with the postal service of the United States. As said by respondent, there is 

 no attempt here to regulate the postal establishment or in any way or degree to affect 

 its operations. Looking to the proper protection of the game of the state for its 

 people, the legislature has prohibited any person within the state from shipping it by 

 parcel post. It must be assumed here that such provision is reasonably necessary 

 to such proper protection. The sole purpose of the enactment is the protection of 

 game for the people of the state. The most that can be said in this connection is 

 that the law may indirectly and remotely affect the postal department by depriving 

 it of this patronage and the consequent revenue which would be paid as postage. 

 Rut this, we think, in view of the decisions we have referred to, can not be held to 

 make the law invalid as unlawfully interfering with the postal service. In a well 

 considered opinion, the court of common pleas of Northampton Count.v, Pennsylvania, 

 reached a similar conclusion as to a recent statute of that state which prohibited 

 shinments of game bv parcel post. (See Com. vs. Reimel, 44 Pa. Co. Court Rep. 

 557.) 



We see no good ground upon which the statutory provision attacked may be held 

 invalid. 



The writ is discharged and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the sheriff of 

 San Mateo County. 



ANGELLOTTI. C. J. 

 We concur : 



SHAW, J. 



SLOSS, J. 



MELVIN, J. 



VICTOR E. SHAW, J. pro tern. 



WILBUR, J. 



