﻿248 Dr. Hare, on a recent "Speculation" by Faraday. 



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it comprises, not of the discontinuous particles of matter with 

 which that space is regularly interspersed. It is in the next place 

 urged that while, agreeably to these considerations, space is 

 shown to be a conductor, there are considerations equally tend- 

 ing to prove it to be a non-conductor; since in certain non-con- 

 ducting bodies, such as resins, there must be nearly as much va- 

 cant space as in potassium. Hence the supposition that atoms 

 are minute impenetrable particles, involves the necessity of con- 

 sidering empty space as a conductor in metals and as a non-con- 

 ductor in resins, and of course in sulphur and other electrics. 

 This is considered as a reductio ad absurdum. To avoid this 

 contradiction, Faraday supposes that atoms are not minute impen- 

 etrable bodies, but, existing throughout the whole space in which 

 their properties are observed, may penetrate each other. Consist- 

 ently, although the atoms of potassium pervade the whole space 

 which they apparently occupy, the entrance into that space of an 

 equivalent number of atoms of oxygen and water, in consequence 

 of some reciprocal reaction, causes a contraction in the boundaries 

 by which the combination thus formed is inclosed. This is an 

 original and interesting view of this subject, well worthy of the 

 contemplation of chemical philosophers. 



But upon these premises Faraday has ventured on some infer- 

 ences which, upon various accounts, appear to me unwarrantable. 

 I agree that "a" representing a particle of matter and "m" rep- 

 resenting its properties, it is only with " m" that we have any 

 acquaintance, the existence of a resting merely on an inference. 

 Heretofore I have often appealed to this fact, in order to show 

 that the evidence both of ponderable and imponderable matter is 

 of the same kind precisely : the existence of properties which can 

 only be accounted for by inferring the existence of an appropriate 

 matter to which those properties appertain. Yet I cannot concur 

 in the idea that because it is only with " m» that we are ac- 

 quainted, the existence of a must not be inferred ; so that bodies 

 are to be considered as constituted of their materialized powers. 



llT th°t I°1 materialized > because it is fully admitted by Fara- 

 day, tnat by ^dispensing with an impenetrable atom "«," we do 

 not get rid of the idea of matter, but have to imagine each atom 

 as existing throughout the whole sphere of its force, instead of 

 being condensed about the centre. This seems to follow from the 

 following language. 



