310 On the Evidence of Certain Phenomena, &c. 
Arr. XXi.—On the evidence of Certain Phenomena in Tides 
and Meteorology; by W. C. Repriexp. 
(From the Journal of the Franklin Institute.) 
Tue “ Notes of an Observer,”’* containing some strictures on two 
papers relating to meteorology, which are found in the twenty third 
volume of the American Journal of Science, are doubtless entitled 
to notice from the writer of this article, which would have been more 
promptly given, had those strictures met his eye at the time of their 
publication ; but he had, unfortunately, no knowledge of their ap- 
pearance, till a few days since, when chance brought them under his 
observation. 
The intelligent writer of the notes introduces his strictures on the 
two papers alluded to, by the following remarks : 
“They contain a most eee collection of facts, which, if well authentica- 
of i h 
ted, will be rtance to meteorological science. Some of them, 
however, are so stiitilgs “and inconsistent with received theories, that I hesi- 
tate to put entire confidence in them, and shall continue to doubt until I have the 
most certain evidence of the facts.” 
As was partially intimated in those papers, circumstances do not 
permit me to set forth in detail the great mass of evidence and au- 
thorities by which the statements in those papers. are sustained, oF 
even to such an extent as I deem to be highly desirable. It does 
not, however, seem necessary that facts in this department of science 
should be rejected, or even doubted, for no better reason than being 
“inconsistent with received theories ;” for while, in the present im- 
proved state of physical science, we are so justly rigid in demanding 
correct inductions from well observed or established facts, before we 
consent to give credence to new theories, it may be well, perhaps, 
to inquire when, and in what manner, the “received theories” im 
meteorology have been demonstrated to be true. That the theories 
in question have long been received, and that they influence = 
control our modes of thinking and reasoning on these subjects, 1S 
doubtless true ; and it is believed that the latter often happens, t00, 
in the face of much positive evidence of their fallacy. Nor is such 
a mental process at all uncommon, even in this age of the exact 
sciences, and I have had occasion to see the most unsupported and 
* Journal of the Franklin Institute, Vol. xiii, p. 9. 
