( si^ ) 



only by one and the same nsimc, ami that, a certain name should apjily only to 

 one and the same animal everywhere. Whoever adheres to this j)rinciple of 

 stability of nomenclature must concede that this end can only be attained 

 by adhering to the first defined name for every animal or jilant. No 

 compromise is possible. Personal jireferences for eui)hony, so-called purity of 

 language, etc., must be sacrificed by all those who sincerely advocate stability 

 of names ; there is no help for it. 



A publication is meant to distribute knowledge acquired by the author. 

 The publication of a new scientific fact or idea is meant to enable the reader to 

 understand what is discovered. As even nowadays names without any attemi)t 

 at e.\j)ositiou are considered valid by a good many systematists, it cannot be 

 wondered at that the definitions published are not always so precise as to 

 advance the knowledge of the reader beyond the fact that something hitherto 

 unknown to the author is defined. We have the description, and do not know 

 vvliat to make of it ; we have a name, and know perhaps what it signifies 

 philologically, but not what its meaning is in natural science. There is no 

 excuse for nuneCL'ssarily vague definitions of varieties, species, genera, etc. ; but 

 there is much in the method of so-called systematic work which explains the 

 frequency of inadequate descriptions. Incompleteness is an inherent character 

 of classificatory research ; the best definition is not complete, and may, therefore, 

 any day become insufficient for recognising the species and variety defined, 

 or must be modified in the case of genera and the higher classificatory cate- 

 gories. A character apparently not worth mentioning to-day may become very 

 important when more allied forms are known. Bnt then, what is the use of 

 having descriptions at all ? Tiiey are nothing but a record sufficient for the 

 time (or meant to be so). They do not profess to be final, though the author 

 may aim at finality. Here, as everywhere, the advance towards completeness 

 is gradual. As our knowledge increases, the definitions of species, genera, etc., 

 become widened or restricted. The definitions change in scope, while the name 

 which was valid for the original definition remains the same. This contrast 

 between a stable nomenclature and a labile knowledge is a nomenclatorial evil 

 and a source of much disagreement among systematists. If we tried to make 

 the names as labile as is our knowledge of nature, the remedy would be worse 

 than the evil. Albeit we cannot do away with the evil altogether, we are at 

 least able to mitigate its severity by the ajiiilicatiou of a dose of common-sense. 

 We all know that the number of specimens on which the definitions of 

 new species and varieties are based — it is of no consequence for our argument 

 which classificatory category the reader designates with the word "species" — is 

 extremely small compared with the number of individuals existing. Innumer- 

 able species have been described from single specimens. Though this specimen 

 or these few individuals may have been abnormal, though the definition is after- 

 wards found not to cover the entire species at all, as an original definition 

 seldom does — unless it is so vague as to cover other species as well — ^the name 

 given to the first-named individual or individuals is accepted for the vast 



