( xxxviii ) 



work to be wliolly scientific ; and nomenclature, the Lxngnage of classification, 

 should therelbrc liave a dift'urent formula for the two different conceptions, if 

 classification is meant to be precise. And the language recording in formulas 

 the results of classification mnst be precise, becanse science has speciall}^ 

 invented the formulas to prevent confusion arising. 



However, liefore going further, let us consider another side of tlie question. 

 It might be argued, with some degree of justification, that nomenclature is 

 a practical invention for the convenience of the classifier (and those who make 

 use of classification), and, as we said above, must not be turned into an 

 inconvenience. Now, if the classifier is compelled to distinguish between 

 geographically isolated forms which are equal to distinct synoecic animals, and 

 such which are not, and again between geographical and non-geographical 

 corjioreally distinct animals, an amount of work is thrown on him which he 

 could easily avoid by treating all definable forms in the same way, as being 

 all co-ordinate. Those of our readers who follow classificatory literature* are 

 aware that we arc not stating an imaginary case, with the object — as so often 

 happens in science and elsewhere — of demolishing an opinion wliicli nobody 

 entertains. Tlie procedure above advocated is certainly a great simplification 

 of work. But we may be allowed to state in response that a far greater 

 simplification can be attained by putting all geographical modifications of the 

 same type down as identical, uomenclatorially and classificatorially. If the 

 splitter who indiscrin:inately calls everything definable a " species " claims 

 the right to live, ourselves as impartial onlookers mnst concede the same right 

 to the lumper who treats everything not conspicuously different as being 

 identical. Tiiese two opponents are almost hopelessly at loggerheads. We say 

 almost ; for we jierccivc some glimmer of hope of a good ending in the fact 

 that, as in the struggle between two nations the victor becomes generally 

 influenced by those details of civilisation in which the vanquished excels, both 

 the lumper and splitter will profit from one another in the course of time, 

 both remaining victorious in the struggle till the end, the one knocking over 

 what the other considers distinct, and the other separating again what the 

 former has put together as the same. Do not let it be truly ad infinitum. We 

 sympathise with both ; for we believe that we understand the cause of the 

 struggle and the reasoif'for its unreasonable continuance. When Linne invented 

 his nomenclature (binominal, except most Lepidoptera) for his classification, he 

 started with the conception that the animated world was composed of a great 

 number of forms which, though variable to a certain — mostly small — extent, 

 were fixed entities. These entities he defined as species, and designated each 

 with a name. Tlic introduction of a precise discrimination (or what was meant 

 to be i)recise) between the species, and their fixation in classification by a name, 

 gave a great imi)ulse to collecting and studying the forms of animated creation. 

 During the last century the material increased at such a rate that the number 

 of species known to Linnt- became soon insignificant as compared with what 



• See, for instance, Vcrh. V. Intern. Xovl. ('unrjirss p. UIO (1902). 



