1820.] Memoirs of the Literary Society of Manchester. 201 



Literari/ and Philosophical Society of Manchester. By William 

 Henry, M.D. F.R.S, &c. — This paper has been already pubhshed 

 in the Annals of Philosophy, vol. xiv. p. 161. 



XV. Ati Essai/ on the Sis^ns of Ideas, or the Means of convey- 

 ing to others a Knowledge of our Ideas. By Edward Carbutt, 

 M.D. Physician to the Manchester Infirmary, &c. &c. — By idea 

 the author of" this paper means the remembrance of a sensation. 

 He is of opinion that the sensations of the eye and ear may be 

 remembered, but is doubtful whether this be the case with those 

 of the nose, the mouth, or the feeling. A remembered sen.^ation 

 or idea is always fainter than the sensation itself, except in cases- 

 of insanity. 



Words are usually considered as the signs of ideas. But our 

 author is of opinion that we very seldom succeed in conveying 

 our own ideas into the minds of our hearers or readers. It is 

 impossible for us to have a name proper for each individual idea 

 or set of ideas. On this account, names have been generalized; 

 and when the appellations tree, horse, man, had been given to 

 one individual of each of these kinds, they naturally enough- 

 came to signify any individual of that kind. Hence the original 

 of general terms, which, by a strange perversion, have been 

 stated to stand for general ideas ; whereas a general idea can- 

 not possibly have any existence ; all ideas are and must be 

 particular. 



The author conceives that there are four sets of words which 

 in no wise represent ideas. 



1. Words which, from the nature of things, are altogether 

 devoid of archetypes. Thus the mathem.atical terms pond and 

 line, our author thinks cannot possibly convey an idea to the 

 mind. This mode of speaking depends upon our author's defi- 

 nition of idea, which restricts its meaning more than is usual in 

 the English language. A point, in the mathematical sense of 

 the word, is the place where one line terminates and another 

 begins. Of this 1 have an accurate notion. But whether it be 

 the remembrance of a sensation will admit of some dispute. 

 The same remark applies to the mathematical word line, which 

 means the place where one surface terminates and another 

 begins. 



2. Words standing not for ideas ; but either for simple and 

 original sensations as are never idealli/ renewed, or for sensa- 

 tions of emotion, which are never called up, except by the 

 original cause, and cannot, therefore, in any case be called ideas. 

 When we reason concerning such sensations, we merely employ 

 the words, which are the names of the original sensations ; and 

 from these words the author thinks that we can reason just as 

 correctly as from real ideas. I must acknowledge that I do not 

 see the full force of this distinction. It appears to me to be 

 rather firncifu! than real. Any person who has been accustomed 

 to smell a rote m\l immediately recognise the same smell whe» 



