278 On the Subdivisions of Science 



too far from my present subject to trace the genesis and con- 

 tinuous development, up to the present day, of either science 

 or art. Of the latter this has never been philosophically 

 attempted so far as I know ; of the evolution of the former, 

 Herbert Spencer has given a brief but very able account 

 in an article republished in his "Illustrations of Universal 

 Progress" (New York, Appleton & Co., 1864), and occa- 

 sionally also in other works. 



Classification of the subdivisions of a subject is an im- 

 portant means of making clear to ourselves and to others 

 our apprehensions ; it may be looked upon as a condensed 

 exposition of the views we hold regarding the subject. It 

 should be made out, I think — except for specific purposes — 

 objectively, i. e., the subjects of the classification should be 

 considered, as much as possible, as to themselves more than 

 in relation to the classifier; although, on final analysis, it 

 becomes obvious that all human learning (knowledge as well 

 as art) is subjective, simply because it is human and there- 

 fore relative. 



I may state, as a fundamental discrimination, the one be- 

 tween the knowable and the unknowable ; and as to the 

 knowable, that between the known and the unknown. It is 

 self-evident that beyond this verbal statement, there can be 

 for us no subdivision and no classification of the unknowable 

 and the unknown. 



It has been held that the known should be classified after 

 the order in which it has been, or may be, built up in the 

 human consciousness ; and it has actually been attempted to 

 be classified after an assumed order of creation ; but, as 

 Herbert Spencer has shown in the article mentioned, it 

 cannot be rationally arranged in any serial order. Each of 

 Jthe subdivisions of science, in wiiich a sufficient amount of 

 exact knowledge has been accumulated to have been general- 

 ized and systematized, is entitled to the independent name 

 of science ; but we must never lose sight of the fact that it 

 is in reality a part of one whole, viz., human knowledge. 



