90 AMERICAN JOURNAL 



or Dr. Gray's generic names at one date witli his names at an- 

 other, will find that the mere-priority rule is thoroughly uncer- 

 tain in its application, principally in consequence of the very 

 loose definitions, and probably loose ideas of the early writers. 

 A modern author thinks that Klein or Link meant by a certain 

 name a genus existing in his own mind, which he accordingly 

 calls Talis, Klein. But a second author thinks (and is quite 

 sure he is right in thinking) that Talis, Klein^ means what is 

 now considered a diftbrent genus, and alters the first author's 

 series of names accordingly. Perhaps Klein meant neither the 

 first, nor the second, nor both ; but had a vague idea which it 

 is now only confusing to endeavor to reproduce. The mere- 

 priority writers often judge of the old authors by their types 

 or figures ; but even the Linnean genera cannot thus be under- 

 stood, and many authors place their typical species in the 

 middle of the series. 



Once more, among the mere-priority writers, some accept a 

 name only if published with description or figure ; others, if 

 the name hs j^rinferl in a list or catalogue ; others, if the name 

 be ivritten in a public, and others, even in a private collection. 

 But perhaps the namer has only spoken the name, or merely 

 thought it; according to the strictest law of priority, might not 

 even these claim precedence ? 



If the principle of limitation be once allowed, questions of 

 detail can be debated and settled with tolerable ease ; and if 

 one author calls his species Grayi, another grayi, and a third 

 Grayana, we all know what is meant, and that may suffice. 

 But if a modern author quotes a Cyclas, a Cajjsa, or a SiUquaria, 

 who knows what is meant ? 



Nomenclature clearly is for use, not for honor or fancy. 

 That is the best which (1) expresses what it means, and (2) can- 

 not mean anything else. That moreover is publication, in the 

 highest sense ; which is found to be in universal use. If in 

 property there is a statute of limitations, and a given number 

 of years' undisturbed possession is tantamount to a right, is 

 there not the same reason for limiting property in a name ? 

 "Why should not long accepted Lamarckian names be regarded 

 as much sacred as are considered those of Linnasus. 



If such are the difficulties of settling the language of the past, 

 not much less are those of the present. In old times a Bucci- 

 num, a Bulla, a 3Iya, meant almost anything. In Lamarckiati 

 times, a Chiton, a Cerithium, a Pleurotoma meant what would 

 now be called a family. If a writer describes under these 

 genera, we know at least in what large division to search for 

 his species. But if he describes a JRissoa, a ModeJia, a Trunca- 

 tella, we have a right to suppose he means what he says, and 



