DECISIONS OF UNITED STATES COURTS. 123 



Driven to these statutes according to the intention of Congress, which is 

 to be ascertained from the words used and consideration of the course 

 of legislation on the subject, and the facts and circumstances known to 

 have been operative in inducing such legislation. . Now, considering the 

 several statutory provisions and the historical facts above recited, and 

 keeping in mind section 1954, which must govern the interpretation of 

 other statutes, referring to the dominion of the United States in Bering 

 Sea, I am constrained to hold that the killing of fur-seals anywhere 

 within the boundaries defined by the treaty referred to in said section 

 is unlawful; and that vessels found within said boundaries engaged in 

 that business are subject to seizure and condemnation as forfeited to 

 the United States. 



There is a question, however, as to the validity of these statutes. 

 On tlie part of the defense it is contended that the criminal laws of the 

 United States can have no force upon the sea beyond the limits of 

 national jurisdiction, which by the law of nations can not extend be- 

 yond the range of cannon shot from the shore; and, therefore, the Gov- 

 ernment has no power to prohibit fishing or the taking of animals which 

 areferra naturce in the open sea, which is common and free to the in- 

 habitants of all nations. 



National dominion and sovereignty may be extended over the sea as 

 well as over land. Should circumstances render it necessary, a nation 

 having the power to do so, may 'issert its dominion over the sea beyond 

 the limits heretofore admitted by the powers of the earth to be lawful. 

 "It is probably safe to say that a State has the right to extend its ter- 

 ritorial waters from time to time at its will with the now increased 

 range of its guns, though it would undoubtedly be more satisfactory 

 tliat an arrangement on the subject should be arrived at by common 

 consent." (1 Wharton's Digest of International Law, p. 114, from 

 Hall's International Law, 127.) 



As our Government is constituted the President and Congress are 

 vested with all the responsibility and powers of the Government for 

 determination of questions as to the maintenance and extension of our 

 national dominion. It is not the province of the courts to participate 

 in the discussion or decision of these questions, for they are of a politi- 

 cal nature and not judicial. Congress and the President having as- 

 sumed jurisdiction and sovereignty, and having made the declarations 

 and assertions as to the extent of our national authority and dominion 

 above indicated, and having by a treaty with Russia established an in- 

 ternational boundary line including a portion of Bering Sea, all the 

 people and the courts of the country are bound by such governmental 

 acts, declarations, and assertions, and by the treaty; and the responsi- 

 bility of maintaining the national authority within the boundaries so 

 fixed, and to the extent asserted by executive and legislative author- 

 ity, against foreign governments rests with the executive and legisla- 

 tive branches of the Government. In the opinion of the Supreme Court 

 in the case of Janes vs. The United States (137 U. S., 202), written by 

 Mr. Justice Gray, the law is thus stated: "Who is the sovereign de 

 jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial but a political question, 

 the determination of which by the legislative and executive depart- 

 ments of any government conclusively binds the judges as well as all 

 other officers, citizens, and subjects of that Government. This princi- 

 ple has always been upheld by this court and has been affirmed under 

 a great variety of circumstances (Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat., 246, 324; 

 United States vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat., 610; The Divina Pastora, 4 Wlieat., 

 52; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253, 307; Keaue vs. McDonaugh, 8 Pet., 



