JURISDICTIONAL RIGHTS IN BERING SEA. 249 



coast is contrary to modern international nsag:e. Mr. Adams and Mr. 

 Canning clearly tliouglit in 1823 that the matter was beyond doubt or 

 discussion. 



The rule which was recognized at that time, and which has been gen- 

 erally admitted both by publicists and Governments, limits the juris- 

 diction of a country in the open sea to a distance of 3 miles from its 

 coasts, this having been considered to be the range of a cannon shot 

 when the princij)le was adopted. 



Wheaton, who may be regarded as a contemporary authority, equally 

 respected in Europe and America, says : 



The maritime territory of every State extends to the ports, harbors, bays, mouths 

 of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea inclosed by headlands belonging to the same 

 State. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of territorial jurisdic- 

 tion a distance of a marine league, or as far as a cannon shot will reach from the 

 shore along all the coasts of the State. 



And again: 



The rule of law on this subject is ierroi dominium finitur uhi finitur armorumvis; 

 and since the introduction of firearms that distance has usually been recognized to 

 be about 3 miles from the shore. 



Chancellor Kent, who is inclined to advocate a more extended limit, 

 still admits that — 



According to the current of modern authority, the general territorial jurisdiction 

 extends into the sea as far as cannon shot will reach, and no farther; and this is 

 generally calculated to be a marine league. 



Calvo, one of the most recent text writers, makes a corresponding 

 statement : 



Les limites juridictionnelles d'nn Etat embrassent non seulement son territoire, 

 mais encore les eaux qui le traversent ou I'entourent, les ports, les bales, les golfes, 

 les embouchures des fleuves et les niers enclav^es dans son territoire. L'usage ge- 

 neral des nations permet ^galement aux Etats d'exercer leur juridiction sur la zone 

 maritime jusqu'a 3 milles marins ou a la port6e de cannon de leurs cotes. 



But I need scarcely appeal to any other authority than that of the 

 United States Government itself. 



In a note to the Spanish minister, dated the 16th December, 1862, 

 on the subject of the Si^anish claim to a 6-mile limit at sea, Mr. Seward 

 stated : ^ 



A third principle bearing on the subject is also well established, namely, that this 

 exclusive sovereignty of a nation — thus abridging the universal liberty of the seas — 

 extends no farther than the power of the nation to maintain it by force, stationed on 

 the coast, extends. This principle is tersely expressed inthemaxim 'Hvrroe dominium 

 finitur uhi finitur armorum vis. 



But it must always be a matter of uncertainty and dispute at what point the force 

 of arms, exerted on the coast, can actually reach. The publicists rather advanced 

 toward than reached a solution when they laid down the rule that the limit of the 

 force is the range of a cannon ball. The range of a cannon ball is shorter or longer 

 according to the circumstances of projection, and it must be always liable to change 

 with the ijuprovement of the science of ordnance. Such uncertainty ujion a point of 

 jurisdiction or sovereignty would be productive of many and endless controversies 

 and conflicts. A morepracticallimitof national jurdisdiction upon the high seas was 

 indispensably necessary, and this was found, as the undersigned thinks, in flxing the 

 limit at 3 miles from the coast. This limit was early proposed by the publicists of 

 all maritime nations. While it is not insisted that all nations have accepted or 

 acquiesced and bound themselves to abide by this rule when applied to themselves, 

 yet three points involved in the subject are insisted upon by the United States: 



1. That this limit has been generally recognized by nations; 



2. That no other general rule has been accepted ; and 



3. That if any State has succeeded in fixing for itself a larger limit, this has been 

 done by the exercise of maritime power, and constitutes an exception to the general 



1 Wharton's International Law Digest, vol. 1, § 32. 

 32 



