260 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE. 



By the territorial demarcation asroed to in tliis "prqjet" Russia will become 

 possessed, iu aclcuowledsed sovcrcinuty, of both sides of Bering iStraits. 



Tlie power which could tliink of making the Pacific a mare vlamitin may not un- 

 naturally be supposed capable of a disposition to apply the same character to a strait 

 comprehended between two shores, of which it becomes the undisputed owner. But 

 the shutting up of Behring Straits, or the power to shut them up hereafter, would 

 be a thing not to be tolerated by England. 



Nor could we submit to be excluded, either positively or constructively, from a 

 sea in which the skill and science of our seamen has been and is still employed in 

 enterprises interesting not to this country alone but the whole civilized world. 



The protection given by the convention to the American coasts of each power may 

 (if it is thought necessary) be extended in teruis to the coasts of the Russian Asiatic 

 territory; but in some way or other, if not in the form now presented, the free navi- 

 gation of Behring Straits, and of the seas beyond them, must be secured to us. 



[Inclosure 15. — Extract.] 

 Mr. G. Canning to Mr. S. Canning. 



No. 1.] Foreign Office, Decemher S, 1S24. 



His Majesty having been graciously pleased to name you his plenipotentiary for 

 concluding and signing with the Russian Government a convention for terminating 

 the discussions which have arisen out of the promulgation of the Russian ukase of 

 1821, and for settling the respective territorial claims of Great Britain and Russia on 

 the northwest coast of Ameriea, I have received His Majesty's commands to direct 

 you to repair to St. Petersburg for that purpose, and to furnish you with the neces- 

 sary instructions for terminating the long-protracted negotiation. 



The correspondence which has already passed upon this subject has been sub- 

 mitted to your perusal. And I inclose you a copy — 



1. Of the "projet" which Sir Charles Bagot was authorized to conclude and sign 

 some months ago, and which we had every reason to expect would have been entirely 

 satisfactory to the Russian Government. 



2. Of a " contre-projet " drawn up by the Russian plenipotentiaries, and presented 

 to Sir Charles Bagot at their last meeting before Sir Charles Bagot's dejiarture from 

 St. Petersburg. 



3. Of a dispatch from Count Nesselrode, accompanying the transmission of the 

 "contre-projet" to Count Lieven. 



In that dispatch, and in certain marginal annotations upon the copy of the " jiro- 

 iet," are assigned the reasons of the alterations proposed by the Russian plenipoten- 

 tiaries. 



In considering the expediency of admitting or rejecting the proposed altcratious, 

 it will be convenient to follow the articles of the treaty in the order in which tiny 

 8 and in the English "projet." 



V(iu will observe in tlie first place that it is proposed by the Russian idenipoten- 

 tiaries entirely to cliange that order, and to transfer to the latter part of the in.stru- 

 nient the article which has hitherto stood first iu the "projet." 



To that transposition we can not agree, for the very reason which Count Nesselrode 

 alleg«s in favor of it, viz, that the "economio," or arrangement of the treaty, ought 

 to have reference to the history of the negotiation. 



The whole negotiation grows out of the ukase of 1821. 



So entirely ami absolutely true is this ])roposition, that the settlement of the limits 

 of the respective possessions of Great Britain and Russia on the northwest coast of 

 America was proposed by us only as a mode of facilitating the adjustment of the dif- 

 ference arising from the ukase, by enabling the court of Russia, under cover of the 

 more comprehensive arrangements, to withdraw, with less appearance of concession, 

 the offensive pretensions of that edict. 



It is comparatively indifferent to us whether we hasten or ]>ostpon(^ all (|ncs(ious 

 respecting the limits of territorial ]tossession on the continent of America, but fiio 

 pretensions of the Russian ukase of 1821 to exclusi\c dominion over the Pacific could 

 not continue longer unrepealed without comptilling us to take some measure of ])ub- 

 ii(^ and effectual remonstrance against it. 



You will therefore take care, in the first instance, to re])ress any attem]>t to give 

 this change to the character of tlie negotiation, and will declare witiioiit reserve 

 that the point to which alone the solicitude of the British ({overniiient and the jeal- 

 ousy of tlu» Britisli nation may attach any great iiii)tortaiice is Wu; doing away (in a 

 mauiicr as little disagreeable to Russia as i)ossible), of the effect of the ukase of 

 1821. 



