372 : The Atlantic 



ders and commands diat all could carry out in concert. Also strag- 

 glers or ships out of position offered a notable target for concen- 

 trated enemy attack. In wearing or in coming about each ship re- 

 quired ample space for its operations, which determined the distance 

 between the vessels of the line. The commander also wished ample 

 sea room for the parade and maneuver of his fleet as a whole, and 

 no one wished his movements restricted by capes and shoals, and in 

 particular nobody wished to be caught on a lee shore. 



In theory a classic naval battle had a set and rather formalized ap- 

 pearance in which one line of battleships met another line of battle- 

 ships in a martial encounter in which good gunnery and good sea- 

 manship were the determining factors. In practice, the battle often 

 broke up into a series of duels between opposing vessels. Also in 

 practice, as the battle progressed the commander's control over the 

 operations of the fleet as a whole diminished in the excitement of 

 battle, and much was left to the courage and ingenuity of the cap- 

 tain of each ship. In time the most intelligent commanders observed 

 that the fleet that early in the batde was fortunate enough to win a 

 slight advantage in the duels between individual ships was apt to 

 multiply this advantage as the battle progressed. Thus, without ex- 

 pressing it so formally, commanders were learning by experience that 

 concentration of firepower was one of the determining factors in this 

 type of naval engagement. 



There was no doubt that in the latter part of the eighteenth cen- 

 tury the British had already on a number of occasions demonstrated 

 their superiority over the French with whom they were so often en- 

 gaged in battle, yet it also became clear that their losses suddenly 

 became alarmingly high at a time when they were engaged in 

 brushes and skirmishes rather than in full-scale naval battles. What 

 was happening was that the French, conscious of their defects and 

 weaknesses, had evolved a new set of naval tactics. About 1870 they 

 developed a new form of naval battle— a defensive one. At the start 

 this had the appearance of the beginning of an old-style set naval 

 battle. The English would be advancing their ships, usually in a Hne- 

 abreast formation. The French would be awaiting them in a line 

 ahead. In this case, however, the French would intentionally select 

 the lee gage, usually considered a disadvantage, but instead of engag- 

 ing in the set battle the French would deliver dieir broadsides 

 against the leading British ships. They would then bear away to lee- 

 ward, reform their line and await the renewal of the British attack 

 when they would repeat the operation. Thus they were able repeat- 



