374 • The Atlantic 



edly to subject the leading British ships to raking fire, and to con- 

 centrate their firepower on a small portion of the English fleet. 



F, W. Lanchester has pointed out that this was probably the be- 

 ginning of the recognition by the defensive side of the value of fire- 

 power in a naval operation. Possibly a similar recognition affected 

 the tactics of offense some two years later. Lanchester does not know 

 whether it was by design or by accident that Admiral Rodney in the 

 Battle of the Saints in 1792 departed from the usual form of battle 

 by cutting through the line of the enemy in concentrating his attack 

 on the center and rear ships. However this form of attack originated, 

 its value was soon recognized and it became a form of operation that 

 was customary with the British and recognized by the French. The 

 French Admiral Villeneuve anticipated that Nelson would employ 

 a plan somewhat similar to this in the Battle of Trafalgar. 



Nelson on October 9 wrote a memorandum on the battle. He as- 

 sumed a combined French and Spanish fleet of forty-six, his own 

 fleet could number no more than forty. He believed that the enemy 

 would travel with a favorable wind in single line ahead formation. 

 His plan was to divide his ships into two lines of sixteen ships and 

 one line of eight ships. The first line of sixteen ships was to engage 

 the rear twelve enemy ships. The second line of sixteen was to en- 

 gage the next eleven enemy ships, the final short line of eight was 

 to concentrate on the next three or four ships of the enemy's van at 

 all cost to prevent the van from returning to the main scene of battle 

 which they would already have passed. Such a return on the part of 

 the van would in any case be laborious and time-consuming. During 

 this time while they were tacking back, Nelson hoped to establish 

 his superiority and win a victory. 



It should be noted that in this plan each of Nelson's three columns 

 outnumbered the section of enemy ships it was to attack. F. W. Lan- 

 chester, who formulated and published a mathematical formula for a 

 measure of military or naval strength which he called the "N" Law" 

 cites this plan of Nelson as an almost perfect example of a tactical 

 plan based on the concentration of power which the law implies. 



Briefly put Lanchester says that a just mathematical measure of 

 relative strength of two forces such as "Reds" and "Blues" is not to 

 be arrived at simply by counting noses. Assuming for the moment 

 that one Red unit was about equal in value to one Blue unit, then 

 NR^ or the "number of reds squared" contrasted with NB" would 

 give a measure of mihtary superiority. Assuming that there were 

 some difference in the military value of Red and Blue units this 



