388 : The Atlantic 



vessels the cost of materials and the wages of American shipwrights 

 and sailors had risen to such a point that she was unable to compete 

 on a sound economic basis with foreign-built, foreign-operated vessels. 



In two World Wars the United States has demonstrated that it has 

 the materials and the technical skills to create a great navy and simul- 

 taneously to build and operate a serviceable merchant marine. At 

 such time the safety of the nation is paramount and costs are of sec- 

 ondary importance, but in times of peace, when the economic factors 

 are all-important, America has let her merchant marine languish. 



The decline in America's maritime position after the Civil War was 

 matched by her decHne in naval strength. At the end of the war 

 America had ships aplenty and some of them had taught lessons to 

 the naval students of Europe, but both lessons and ships were repug- 

 nant to Congress and the voters behind Congress. The existence of 

 many old ships blinded the nation to the need for any new ones. 

 Expensive repairs were succeeded by extensive reconstructions until 

 the ships became priceless antiques; polyglot crews and well-trained 

 Annapolis officers frittered and fretted in elaborate idleness; the most 

 terrible and resounding batdes in which the navy engaged were those 

 fought in the bureaus and offices between the deck officers who 

 wished to continue the use of sail, which they understood, and the 

 engineers who longed for a modern navy in steam and steel. 



The stagnation, apathy and graft in naval repairs continued to the 

 8o's, at which time matters were so bad that reports of boards of naval 

 officers at last won the ear of Congress. The legislative hearing was 

 sharpened by the fact that a current war between Peru and Bolivia 

 on one side and Chile on the other had not only proved the value of 

 an active navy but also demonstrated that Chilean ships were bet- 

 ter than any in the United States Navy. Timidly and reluctantly recon- 

 struction commenced in 1883 and was stepped up in 1885 so that the 

 navy showed some awakening strength to support its interests in 

 Samoa in 1889 and in Hawaii in the 1890's. There was need for all the 

 speed in building and skill in operation the navy could muster for in 

 1895 Britain and Venezuela were in dispute over the boundary of 

 British Guiana and President Cleveland was ready to invoke the 

 Monroe Doctrine should Britain refuse arbitration. 



That she did not refuse must have been due to some mixture of 

 motives such as convenience, forbearance, preoccupation with other 

 interests and not to any American show of strength, for even with 

 then-current increases and improvements the United States Navy 

 would have been about as dangerous to a British fleet as the attack of 



