426 : The Atlantic 



134. On the contrary, the American destroyers, the use of the convoy 

 system and the other measures of submarine defense began to prove 

 effective. 



By October the number of submarine sinkings had dropped to 

 458,723 tons. This was encouraging even though by this time the 

 total of sinkings had accounted for the loss of 8,000,000 tons of ship- 

 ping. The Germans, however, were suffering losses. It was later as- 

 certained that they had lost fifty submarines. This was a loss and a 

 drain on resources that Germany could ill afford. By April of 191 8, 

 one year after American entry into the war and after the subs had 

 established their record sinking, Allied shipping losses had dropped 

 to 277,934 tons. The joint web of British and American defenses ex- 

 tended from the North Sea into the Mediterranean. The German 

 unrestricted submarine warfare was proving itself a costly failure and 

 America was in the war to stay to the bitter end. 



As a part of its contribution to submarine defense the United 

 States undertook the principal responsibility for laying a North Sea 

 mine barrage. This involved the development of a new type sub- 

 surface mine and the conversion of steamers from the eastern sea- 

 board of America into mine layers. These ships succeeded in placing 

 a litde less than 600,000 of these mines; the British in the meantime 

 placing over 13,000. The mine barrage extended from Scotland to 

 Norway — a distance of 250 miles. Hemmed in by the mines and 

 chased by the aircraft and surface vessels, a trip on a German sub- 

 marine could hardly be rated as a health cruise. It became increas- 

 ingly difficult to man the remaining German submarines. 



The American shipbuilding program was formulated as part of 

 the answer to the submarine war but was slow and bungling in its 

 approaches to the task of creating adequate ships and services. The 

 Emergency Fleet Corporation got off to a bad start in projecting a 

 program of wooden ship construction. The shipping board was 

 therefore compelled to assemble ships by every conceivable means 

 and from every conceivable source. Vessels were bought (233) from 

 foreign nations, chartered (331) and seized (97) from the enemy, 

 including the Vaterland, which became the Leviathan, a transport 

 capable of accommodating 12,000 troops. One of the uses of this 

 hastily assembled emergency fleet was to transport to Europe about 

 half of the 2,000,000 men that America contributed to the war effort 

 — the other half being transported in vessels of British registry. 



During 191 8 the Emergency Fleet Corporation began getting ships 

 into the water under a revised building program. As though to atone 



