428 : The Atlantic 



wehr troops revolted behind the lines. The emperor fled to Holland 

 and after Germany had agreed to withdraw across the Rhine and 

 other concessions, an armistice was signed on November 11, 191 8. 



At the time o£ the Paris Peace Conference it was clear that the 

 United States had emerged from the war as a great naval and com- 

 mercial power with a merchant marine second only to that of Eng- 

 land. Britain was surprised and shocked and Wilson found that her 

 views on naval affairs were as strong and tough as those of Clemen- 

 ceau and Orlando on boundaries and armies ashore. 



Naval disarmament and limitation were discussed at Paris without 

 profitable result. However, by 1921 Harding was able to call a naval 

 conference in Washington. By this time all the nations, with the pos- 

 sible exception of Japan, were clamorous in their pursuit of "nor- 

 malcy" or peacetime pursuits and were anxious to cut down war ex- 

 penditures and commitments. Prices were high and cumulative war 

 debts enormous. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes opened 

 the meeting by declaring that the United States would abandon its 

 building program and scrap fifteen battleships, representing 845,700 

 tons; England was to lop off 583,370 tons and Japan 448,928 tons. 

 The United States was thus generously offering to cut its lead in 

 capital ships. A final agreement provided a ratio among the leading 

 nations, i.e., Britain, U.SA., Japan, France and Italy of 5-5-3-1 .7-1 .7. 

 Joined to a Four Power Treaty to preserve the peace in the Pacific 

 and a Nine Power Treaty covering an "open door" policy in China, 

 the prospect of reduced armaments seemed quite real. The trouble 

 was that the United States had sacrificed her outstanding position 

 in capital ships but gained little, for there was no agreement made 

 on cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc. Later, in 1927, a further con- 

 ference on naval matters called at Geneva to cover the lesser ship 

 categories bogged down in disagreements. In 1929 a London confer- 

 ence resulted in a nominal 15-15-9 ratio on capital ships for England, 

 U.S.A., Japan, and some control program for lesser ships, but France 

 and Italy came to no agreement and did not sign. No doubt these 

 treaties were in part effective but their limited and partial character 

 doomed them to ultimate failure. It was also an ironical fact that the 

 great depression which began with the stock market crash in 1929 

 exercised a more austere control over naval programs than any inter- 

 national agreements and in the United States a "treaty navy" did not 

 come into existence until the world was again at war. 



At the time of the complete defeat and surrender of Germany it 



