GILBERT F. WHITE 211 



or created to carry out this set of aims? The chief trend in organiza- 

 tion during the fifty years has been to estabHsh or strengthen single- 

 purpose agencies. This is not surprising in view of the application of 

 loosely defined objectives to more and more fields and the shift of 

 emphasis toward positive development for multiple purposes. As the 

 need was felt for more vigorous action in particular fields such as 

 hydroelectric power, soil conservation, national parks, or water-pollu- 

 tion abatement, new units were set up, for the most part in the depart- 

 mental structure, and a kind of splintering operation went on. This 

 appears to have been as true at the state level as at the federal level. 



Most of the new or enlarged agencies followed traditional patterns 

 of bureau organization, but a few were innovations, and as such they 

 deserve attention. One was the Federal Power Commission, which 

 among other duties was given responsibility for weighing proposed 

 licenses in the light of comprehensive schemes for improvement for 

 navigation, power, and other beneficial public uses. But in terms of 

 the purposes contemplated by the old Inland Waterways Commission, 

 the FPC has never reached its goal. It did not exercise that develop- 

 ment function in a positive way, and left the planning initiative largely 

 to prospective licencees or to other public agencies. 



A second innovation was the interstate compact mechanism, used 

 not only as a means of establishing boundaries and water rights but 

 also of promoting further allocations and uses of resources. It may be 

 too early to assess some of those experiments which, like the Potomac 

 and Upper Mississippi River water-pollution agreements, have oper- 

 ated only a few years. But assessment of others is needed and is in 

 progress. Some of the more impressive records of development, af- 

 fecting fisheries, water pollution, and oil, have been linked with regu- 

 latory powers. However, the Interstate Oil Compact Commission 

 regulated oil production primarily to prevent surfeit and price deteri- 

 oration, with the "conservation" effects being less certain. The en- 

 thusiasm for new interstate mechanisms has waned somewhat in recent 

 years as the earlier ventures such as the Colorado and Rio Grande 

 commissions have run into long delays. Probably none of the uses of 

 this device in the resources area has had the success of the interstate 

 ventures in parole systems, regional education, and metropolitan trans- 

 port development. 



