GILBERT F. WHITE 223 



reject it. Those who endorsed it had no grounds for assurance that it 

 was the most effective means for stimulating development of the area's 

 resources in the public interest, loosely defined. They only knew that 

 it was the sole detailed plan available and that their choice was be- 

 tween the Upper Colorado plan or nothing for a considerable time 

 to come. 



The Upper Colorado experience is symptomatic of a large propor- 

 tion of the decisions made on both the national and the state levels 

 concerning natural resources. A program or policy growing out of the 

 relatively circumscribed task of one agency is put forward for ap- 

 proval or rejection. It is accepted, accepted with modifications, or re- 

 jected. The two fundamental questions of what will be its full effects 

 and what would be the effects of other possible programs cannot be 

 answered with the data and time then available. 



The kind of analysis the nation most needs would present estimates 

 of the consequences of each of the politically practicable lines of pub- 

 lic action. Thereby, the political process of choice would be sharpened 

 rather than curbed, and governmental intervention seen in perspective 

 with the alternatives. 



An organization or procedure to sharpen the process of political 

 choice has not yet had a fair trial in the United States. Ephemeral 

 commissions are a lame substitute. The task never was undertaken at 

 the state level, and at the national level in the National Resources 

 Planning Board it was loaded with public works review and had barely 

 begun before it was halted. Moreover, the tools for analysis were 

 much less promising fifteen years ago than they are today. The Bureau 

 of the Budget has tended to stop short of exploring viable alternatives, 

 although it has made efforts, as in the case of water programs, to es- 

 tablish criteria which would permit comparison. New machinery is 

 needed to carry out a more penetrating appraisal in the Executive 

 Office and in the departments. 



Agency consolidation, policy formulation. Congressional reorgani- 

 zation, and interagency co-ordination may, indeed, help reduce fric- 

 tion and reconcile operating methods. But they are less basic than an 

 agency or procedure to focus attention upon the choices and effects of 

 public action. Even with such a mechanism we could expect con- 

 tinued conflict, divergence, and pluralism of approach. As Norman 



