CHARLES M. HARDIN 229 



tions supply minerals in competition with our domestic producers; 

 many export agricultural products of which we also have current sur- 

 pluses. Economic integration with such countries will be attained only 

 by overcoming grinding conflicts of interests of which many are en- 

 trenched in our natural resource policy — some of these policies, such 

 as petroleum and wool quotas and tariffs on lead and zinc, running 

 obviously and directly counter to integration; and others having a 

 more indirect though probably no less powerful adverse effect through 

 a series of apparent deals or logrolls, for example, between reclama- 

 tion and sugar interests. We have lived for a long time with these 

 political bargains which have been rationalized as the price of union. 

 With dramatic suddenness the bargains have become dangerous and 

 the apologies obsolete. 



The second weakness of current proposals for reform lies in the 

 assumption that the problem will be solved if it is left in a basket on 

 the President's doorstep. When the problem is seen in proper breadth 

 and perspective, however, the logical place for the evaluation required 

 is in the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau now is responsible for 

 legislative, fiscal, and administrative overview; it is already a part of 

 the Office of the President. Nothing is gained by trying to shove deci- 

 sions closer to the President himself. F. D. Roosevelt's defeats at the 

 hands of the Army Engineers in the Kings River project and (in 

 part) of the Forest Service in the reorganization bill of 1938 show 

 that even an extremely powerful and vigorous president may not be 

 able to control natural resource interests. If the Presidency can be 

 given stronger and more continuous power over the substance of pol- 

 icy, over finances, and over administration, then the Bureau of the 

 Budget can do the staff work necessary for formulating Presidential 

 decisions. If not, then not even the President can do the job effec- 

 tively. 



The major disagreement with my analysis is stated by Ernest S. 

 Griffith who argues in the opening essay of this book that our political 

 institutions are now properly organized for making natural resource 

 policy, needing only to improve and to make better use of present 

 instruments (chiefly staff services) for organizing intelligence. "In 

 minor matters," he says, 



