56 AVES ISLAND. 



This strict rule, as just observed, is not adhered to in modern cases, 

 but it is now generally held both by the civil and common law that 

 any undue constraint operating upon the mind and will of a prudent 

 man, though he may not be put in bodily fear, renders the act not 

 voluntary, and vitiates it. — (See Kent's Comm., part 5, § 39, and cases 

 cited; 16 Vesey, p. 159; 1 Ibid., jr., p. 22; 16 Vesey, p. 159; 11 Ibid., 

 p. 649; 1 Jacob and Walker, p. 96; 14 Vesey, p. 289; 2 Coke's Inst., 

 5Kep., p. 149.) 



In the case of a government the rules should be still more extended, 

 by reason of the fact that the very demand by a government, made 

 through its officers, carries with it, to all law-observing men, the con- 

 straint of obedience. When such demand is imperative, backed by 

 an armed naval and military force, commanded by a military and 

 naval officer, and accompanied by threats and menaces, stated to be by 

 order of the government, an act, agreement, contract, concession, re- 

 linquishment, or admission obtained thereby from the citizen or sub- 

 ject of another government, is void and of no force, as being given 

 under duress. The law of individual contract applies to it, though it 

 cannot be asserted as a well settled principle that a nation can plead 

 duress.— (See Wheat., p. 324;^ Kliiber, § 142.) 



It is sufficient if the party is constrained by apprehensions of the 

 power of such government being exerted to the injury of his rights 

 or his interests, in respect of property, the subject of contest, though 

 such apprehension may not extend to bodily harm to himself. — (See 

 Puff., lib. 3, c. 6, § 9, p. 281 ; § 10, note 3, p. 285, cites Plato.) 



If he is constrained by apprehension or well founded belief of colli- 

 sion between such armed force and himself, or individuals associated 

 with him, and that personal injury may result to any or either side, 

 or that he may have imposed upon him the necessity of forcible re- 

 sistence to such governmental authority and officers, and military force 

 under the command of such officers, and may be obliged to overcome 

 and capture such force, to do which he possesses the ability ; even such 

 constraint nullifies his acts of concession and his admissions, as not 

 being voluntary. — (See Puff., lib. 22, &c., before cited, and ut passim.) 



Besides, it is the duty of every law-abiding subject or citizen, en- 

 joined by the principles of the laws of nations, ordinarily in such 

 cases to yield to the demands of such foreign government, and if he is 

 wronged, to appeal to his own government to obtain him redress. 



It is upon this principle that it has been held that the hostile rescue 

 by a neutral crew of a neutral vessel, captured in time of war by one 

 of the belligerents, though the vessel may not be a good prize, if re- 

 taken again by captors of the same power, it is liable to confiscation 

 for such recapture by the court of the belligerent power. — (See Wheat, 

 Int. Laiv, p. 455.) 



The neutral resists at his peril, and such resistance has been held to 

 divest him of his immunity from capture as a neutral. This is at least 

 the British doctrine, though it may be questioned. 



In this case, the intrusion of Venezuela by an armed force, and our 

 -p. on was in time of profound peace between the two governments. 



y resistance our employes could, doubtless, at the risk of bloodshed, 

 have overcome and made prisoners Dias, his vessel, and his whole 



