AVES ISLAND. 57 



force. By refusing the provisions and water, in a few days we could 

 have starved them out, in all probability; but we were not only not 

 bound to adopt any such means of resistance, but, on the contrary, it 

 was our duty to limit our opposition to remonstrance and protest. 



Vattel says, § 223, p. 399, that the unexpected attack of foreigners 

 may be repelled on the ground of self-defense ; but they are advised 

 not to commit hostilities, even in time of war, without a commission. 



And if to keep the peace, prevent probable bloodshed, or injury to 

 our rights and interests, either with respect to our vessels, their car- 

 goes, the isle, the guano thereon, or our other property there, or the 

 welfare and safety of our employes, our agents were constrained to 

 yield, as they did, their acts do not impair, or compromise, or weakeny 

 or prejudice^, or militate against our original rights because of such 

 restraint. (See Vattel, § 325, p. 275; 9 Cranch, 55.) 



The intended effect of Bias's acts and the legal effect of his acts are 

 the same — constraint of Gibbs, &c., and thereby his concessions were 

 not voluntary, 



XXII. ADMISSIONS BY AGENTS. 



Admissions or agreements of an agent beyond the scope of his au- 

 thority and its objects, and also sale, transfer, or relinquishment, or an 

 extinguishment, or concession, or admission by an agent, cannot be 

 allowed to destroy his principal's right to property intrusted to his care 

 and management; and acts destroying or relinquishing such right or 



^ compromising it upon inequitable terms, are prima facie to be regarded 

 as made without authority of his principal, and do not bind him. (See 

 2 Phill., p. 63, § 49, citing Vattel, lib. 2, c. 12, § 158; Wheaton, p., 

 832, § 8, citing Ed. Keview, No. 154, ar. 1; Grotius De Jure Bel, 

 lib. 2, 14, §§ 4, 12; Martens Precis, lib. 2, c. §§ 50, 52; Lee vs. Mun- 

 roe, 1 Cranch, p. 366; Wilson vs. Turner, 1 Taunton, p. 398; Puff., 



'lib. 3, c. 7, ar. 11, p. 304; U. S. vs. Gooding, 12 Wheat., p. 460.) 



No admission by an individual of a thing, of the truth of which,he 

 is not necessarily cognizant, and as to which he has no peculiar means 

 of knowledge, though he 'he an agent, is not conclusive in any case, 

 and if incorrect — as is the fact in this case — it is of no force or effect 

 whatever. (See General Ins. Co. vs Buggies, 12 Wheat., p. 408; 1 

 Doniat, p. 425, ch. 3, ar. 1, § 1186 to 1192; Ibid., p. 427, § 1146, § 

 1154.) 



' And this is so, whether as respects his own rights, or the rights of 

 others. With regard to the rights of others, if of matters of fact, such 

 admissions are considered as mere hearsay. They are never noticed; 

 are not competent testimony either by the civil or common law, and 

 whether oral or in writing ; and if matters of law, or matters of fact 

 and law mixed, as in this case, they are of no weight whatever. 



If such agent knows any facts, he must be adduced as a witness by 

 the party claiming under his acts, or seeking the advantage of his 

 admissions. This is the law in cases between individuals, and it applies 

 to governments. (See 10 Vesey, pp. 128, 763; 1 Taunton, p. 398, 

 Wilson vs. Turner.) 



The power of a proxy or agent must be limited by reasonable pre- 



