238 AVES ISLAND. 



» 



sense and common justice such rule witli regard to agents and their 

 acts must "be recognized. 



It betrays a lamentable ignorance of the elementary principles of 

 justice, upon which those rules are all based, to question their exist- 

 ence. Not a law book on the subject of agency can be found that does 

 not reiterate them as well settled, and it applies to all acts, whether 

 the acts of individuals or of governments. 



Even if a minister of the United States should, whether in lament- 

 able ignorance of the law or not, fully cognizant of the facts, or dis- 

 posed to pretermit the just rights of his government or its citizens, 

 make concessions or admissions, either of law or of fact, in derogation 

 of these rights, without instructions from his government, who can 

 pretend that the government should be bound by them ? 



With respect to the ulterior action of the government, in case Vene- 

 zuela should persist in withholding justice, the claimants, P. S. Shel- 

 ton and Sampson & Tappan, would suggest: 



First. They have heretofore ex dbundante cautela, presented to the 

 President of the United States in December last a formal application 

 to be placed in possession of Aves Island under the act of 18th August, 

 1856, a law framed expressly to meet this very case, and to which the 

 executive decision still remains suspended awaiting the action of Vene- 

 zuela. 



The formal petition to the President, and a copy of which is on file 

 in the department, is referred to, and a copy of the act herewith in- 

 closed, and the fifth section is respectfully referred to, which authorizes 

 the President, "at his discretion, to employ the land and naval forces 

 of the United States to j^rotect the rights of the said discoverer or 

 discoverers, or their assigns, as aforesaid." 



Second. These claimants insist, also, most respectfully that it is their 

 right to demand of their government, if payment of their just and 

 manifest indemnity is denied them, special letters of reprisal against 

 the Venezuelan government under the law of nations ; and they insist, 

 also, that it is the constitutional duty of the Executive Department of 

 the government of the United States to see these laws faithfully exe- 

 cuted by the granting of such letters. 



Whilst they concede that the power to issue general letters of marque 

 and reprisal {quasi acts of war) is not vested by the Constitution upon 

 the Executive without previous authority of Congress, they contend 

 that such restriction does not apply to a special letter of reprisal, which 

 is in no sense an act of war, or even a casus belli, but that it is an exe- 

 cutive function, to be exercised and performed by the Executive at his 

 own sound discretion, and upon his sole official responsibility. 



If, however, any doubt existed on this point under the act of August 

 18, 185 6_, above cited, so far forth as it respects Shelton's Isle, legisla- 

 tive authority unquestionably exists. 



Ugon the subject of reprisals, whether the exercise is stipulated in 

 the treaty or not, and as to the distinction between general and special 

 reprisals, and as to special reprisals being the proper remedy in this 

 case, these claimants will, if desired by the department, submit a full 

 brief. 



The long endurance of our government and these claimants of nearly 



