AVES ISLAND. 249 



immediately preceding it, which latter are in themselves a kind of 

 informal war. 1 Molloy, (c. 2, f 8,) says: ''The granting of letters 

 of reprisal does not, in the ordinary way, for particular satisfaction, 

 amount to the breach of the peace." (3 Phill., c. 2, p. 11. 1 Kent's, 

 p. 61. 1 Le Page's Elements, p. 326. Yalin, Comm. on Art. 1 of 

 Ord. of 1681, p. 414, &c.' 2 Azune, p. 2, c. 5, § 9. 1 Elliot's Deb., 

 p. 110; 4 lb., 458.) 



III. Special reprisals have been usually allowed to obtain redress for 

 a citizen or subject who hath been wronged, and general or extraordi- 

 nary reprisals, as before observed, are more appropriate for injuries 

 directly to a State ; but it cannot be doubted that a State may direct 

 special reprisals for pecuniary injuries to itself in the same manner as 

 for injuries done to one of its citizens or subjects. 



The authorities, also, sustain this position. 1 Massie, p. 138, § 131, 

 and authorities cited there, and those contained in list annexed uf 

 passim. 



IV. The unjust, illegal, and injurious acts of individuals of a State, 

 equally as the acts of such State by its authorities, if no redress is given 

 against such offending individuals, constitute a proper cause for special 

 reprisals. (See same authorities.) 



A State is liable for the acts of its citizens, if means of just redress 

 are withheld or not afforded against them to the injured party. 



The citizens or subjects of a State are each and all liable per my et 

 per tout for the liabilities of a State; and, on the other hand, the State 

 is responsible for the acts of its individual members in so far as it does 

 yield just remedies for redress against them to an injured party. (Vat- 

 tel 6, 2, § 81, 82, 342, 344. Grot. 6, 3, c. 2, p. 538. Wildman, c. 5, 

 p. 187. Felice, v. 12, p. 1T8. 5 St. Edme, p. 270. 1 Massie, p. 134, 

 § 137. De Garden 64, § 3, p. 229, &c. 2 Azuui, c. 5, a. 2, 5, 7. 

 Euth. Inst., 516, 517, v. c. ix, § 13.) 



V. The withholding payment of a just debt from a State or citizen, 

 or subject of a State, or the denial or unreasonable delay of justice in 

 regard thereof, it is conceded, though it constitutes a case for special 

 reprisals, is not so strong a case as that where redress is sought for 

 illegal violence by the authorities or citizens or subjects of the State 

 against the persons or property of citizens or subjects of a State resort- 

 ing to such remedy. The English denied, in the Silesian loan case,' 

 that reprisals extended by the law of nations to cases of debt, except 

 in cases of justice absolutely denied, first by tribunals, and afterwards 

 by the prince, and such denial must be in re minime duhia. (1 Keddie 

 E., 269. Contra W. Inst. c. v. p. , as to limiting remedy to case, 

 violence, &c.) Precedents can be found, both of debt and of violence. 

 In case of debt, however, the creditor is bound to submit to the lex loci 

 contractus, and to the lex fori as administered by the State complained 

 of to and between its own subjects or citizens ; and, if equal rights 

 are conceded, and the same remedies yielded, no just cause of complaint 

 exists. This principle cannot, however, apply in terms to cases of debt 

 due by a sovereign State, as in most countries such sovereignty cannot 

 be made a defendant in its own courts. In such case the complaining 

 State may resort, in limine, to special letters of reprisal to coerce the 



