AVES ISLAND. 257 



Under these circumstances, fully cognizant as Venezuela is of all 

 lie facts of the case, and has been since the wrong was committed, 

 nearly three years since, apprised as she has been from time to time 

 of the proofs we have adduced, according to the terms of the treaty of 

 1836, it is submitted that any further forbearance to her to enable her 

 to indulge her disposition to shuffle and equivocate, should be limited 

 to the time necessary to understand the character of the demand made 

 by the United States. And Venezuela should not only be peremptorily 

 required to admit liability to make indemnity, and to give assurance 

 of just satisfaction to the claimants, but with respect to the amount of 

 damages, she should be held to show to the satisfaction of this gov- 

 ernment that the amount claimed by us is exorbitant, and wherein 

 the same is exaggerated, and her willingness to pay what is not so 

 controverted by proofs to be promptly adduced by her. And upon 

 this point we contend that without indubitable proof so adduced, the 

 amount claimed by us, especially if previously determined by process 

 of ascertainment above indicated, must be regarded as the just amount 

 due. 



Especially should this rule obtain, as such amount is not conclusive; 

 but, if it is proper^ it may be reduced by deductions on the trial before 

 the judicial tribunals when the letters of reprisal have been issued and 

 executed by the seizure of property brought before such tribunal for 

 condemnation and sale. 



The idea of referring, lite 'pendente, the amount of damages to the 

 arbitrament of a third power, is not only derogatory to the dignity of 

 the complaining State, but it is vexatious and unjust to the individual 

 claimants, and is also inconsistent with all proceedings looking to the 

 issuance of special letters of reprisal as the ultimate remedy. It breeds 

 procrastination and delay, and causes great and unnecessary expenses 

 to the claimants. It is the abnegation, by the complaining State, of 

 the rightful jurisdiction of its own judicial tribunals over the ultimate 

 decision of the question of damages with which such tribunals are 

 invested by the law of nations, and to the benefit of which its citizens 

 are entitled. They should not be deprived of that benefit (or advan- 

 tage if it be such) in such cases, and shufiled ofi" by a reference to a 

 third power or party not administering justice under jadicial sanction, 

 and often subject to influences to which a court of justice is impregna- 

 ble, and affected by considerations other than the strict maintenance 

 of the principles of international law. It is an interference with the 

 regular -course of proceeding, and a departure from the rules sanc- 

 tioned by the practice of ages as best promotive to the ends of justice. 

 As well might a State abnegate the exclusive jurisdiction of its own 

 prize courts in time of war, under the laws of nations, and agree to 

 refer the decisions of questions of prize or no prize, or of any inciden- 

 tal question arising in the progress of a prize cause, to a third power 

 or person, as to refer this incidental question of the amount of dam ages 

 to such arbitrament. Such course, in the argument of Kyder and 

 Maiisfield, on the Silesia loan case, it is declared would be " manifestly 

 unjust, absurd, and impracticable." (1 Eeddie Int. Mar. Law, -p. 

 269. 1 Magens, on Insurance, p. 491.) Such procedure must be 

 founded upon the theories of the speculative philosophers of the era of 

 Ex. Doc. 10 17 



